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ABSTRACT 
 
Endemic corruption in developing countries often seems intractable. Yet most countries that cur-
rently have relatively high public integrity were, at an earlier point in their history, afflicted with sim-
ilarly pervasive corruption. Studying the history of these countries may therefore make a valuable 
contribution to modern debates about anticorruption reform. This paper considers the experience of 
the United States, focusing principally on the period between 1865 and 1941. We find that the U.S. 
experience calls into question a number of commonly-held views about the struggle against corrup-
tion in modern developing countries. First, although some argue that entrenched cultures of corrup-
tion are virtually impossible to dislodge, the U.S. experience demonstrates that it is possible to make 
a transition from a systemically corrupt political system to a system in which public corruption is 
aberrational. Second, although some have argued that tackling systemic corruption requires a “big 
bang” approach, the U.S. transition away from endemic corruption would be better characterized as 
incremental, uneven, and slow. Third, although some have argued that fighting corruption requires 
shrinking the state, in the U.S. reductions in systemic corruption coincided with a substantial expan-
sion of government size and power. Fourth, some commentators have argued that “direct” anticor-
ruption measures that emphasize monitoring and punishment do not do much good in societies 
where corruption is pervasive. On this point, the lessons from U.S. history are more nuanced. Insti-
tutional reforms played a key role in the U.S. fight against corruption, but investigations and prose-
cutions of corrupt actors were also crucial, not only because of deterrence effects, but because these 
enforcement efforts signaled a broader shift in political norms. The U.S. anticorruption experience 
involved a combination of “direct strategies,” such as aggressive law enforcement, and “indirect strat-
egies,” such as civil service reform and other institutional changes. 
 
   
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar 
Justice, California Supreme Court, 
Herman Phleger Visiting Professor of Law and 
affiliated scholar, Freeman Spogli Institute for 
International Studies, Stanford University 
tcuellar@stanford.edu 
Matthew C. Stephenson 
Eli Goldston Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School 
mstephen@law.harvard.edu  
  3 
Endemic public corruption is one of the most serious and seemingly intractable problems afflicting 
the modern developing world.1 Corruption is associated with lower per capita income,2 higher lev-
els of poverty and inequality,3 worse health outcomes,4 less innovation and entrepreneurship,5 
greater risk of macroeconomic crises,6 lower levels of public trust,7 and higher levels of political in-
stability and violence.8 The extent to which corruption is the root cause of these or other problems 
is unsettled and hotly debated, but there is nevertheless a widespread consensus that corruption in 
the developing world is both pervasive and harmful. There is substantially less consensus, however, 
about what can be done about it. Many activists and policymakers have grown weary of research 
that merely describes the problem; they are increasingly asking the so-called experts for guidance on 
reform strategy—including what lessons can be learned from those jurisdictions that have suc-
ceeded in getting corruption under control. 
 
Unfortunately, unambiguous modern success stories are few and far between, especially if one is 
looking for examples of large democracies that have tackled corruption effectively.9 The two most 
frequently noted modern anticorruption success stories—Hong Kong and Singapore in the 
1970s—are nondemocratic city-states, and their corruption cleanups were largely top-down initia-
tives.10 Other more recent examples of apparent success, like the Republic of Georgia in the 2000s, 
also appear very much driven by relatively unconstrained, and some would say semi-autocratic, 
chief executives.11 Although there are certainly some major democracies that have achieved im-
                                                     
1 Corruption is notoriously difficult to define, and is sometimes used broadly to capture a wide range of ways in which 
a system may be dysfunctional, captured, or morally compromised. For present purposes, we adopt a narrower definition 
widely used in the literature—the misuse of public office for private gain. By this we mean, for instance, bribery of public 
officials, embezzlement or other misappropriation of public funds for personal or partisan benefit, exploitation of private 
government information for private financial gain, or basing government hiring or contracting on family, partisan, or other 
personal connections. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption,” in CHARLES K. ROWLEY & FRIEDRICH G. SCHNEIDER 
EDS., READINGS IN PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 551, 551 (2008). See also MARK W. SUMMERS, 
THE ERA OF GOOD STEALINGS ix (1993) (adopting a definition of “corruption” that includes “the illegal and generally unac-
ceptable use of public position for private advantage or exceptional party profit, and the subversion of the political process 
for personal ends beyond those of ambition”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 See Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Growth Without Governance, 3 ECONOMIA 169, 169-173 (2002). 
3 See Alberto Chong & Cesar Calderon, Institutional Quality and Income Distribution, 48 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & 
CULTURAL CHANGE 761 (2000). 
4 See Matthieu Hanf et al., Corruption Kills: Estimating the Global Impact of Corruption on Children Deaths, 6 PLOS 
ONE (2011) 
5 See Sergey Anokhin & William S. Schulze, Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Corruption, 24 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
VENTURING 465 (2009). 
6 See Pattama L. Shimpalee & Janice Bourcher Breuer, Currency Crises and Institutions, 25 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
MONEY & FINANCE 125 (2006). 
7 See Eric C.C. Chang, A Comparative Analysis of How Corruption Erodes Institutional Trust, 9 TAIWAN JOURNAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 73 (2013). 
8 See SARAH CHAYES, THIEVES OF STATE: WHY CORRUPTION THREATENS GLOBAL SECURITY (2016).  
9 See, e.g., DAN HOUGH, ANALYSING CORRUPTION: AN INTRODUCTION (2017). 
10 See Jon S.T. Quah, Controlling Corruption in City-States: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong and Singapore, 22 
CRIME, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 391 (1994). 
11 See Alexander Kupatadze, The Quest for Good Governance: Georgia’s Break with the Past, 27 JOURNAL OF DEMOC-
RACY 110 (2016). 
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portant anticorruption breakthroughs over the past 30 years—including Italy’s “Clean Hands” in-
vestigations and associated political reforms,12 Indonesia’s creation of surprisingly effective anticor-
ruption institutions following the transition to democracy in the late 1990s,13 South Korea’s recent 
legal reforms,14 and Brazil’s “Car Wash” operation15—it is hard to demonstrate that these or other 
efforts have achieved substantial and lasting reductions in the pervasiveness of public corruption. A 
skeptic might point out that if one looks at the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published an-
nually by the advocacy organization Transparency International since 1995, very few countries have 
seen a substantial improvement,16 and those score changes we have seen many largely reflect ran-
dom statistical noise.17 Corruption, at least at the macro-level, appears to be not only pervasive, but 
also quite resistant to change. 
 
If we look further back in time, however, the picture—especially with respect to the potential for 
substantial transformation—looks quite different, and considerably more encouraging. After all, 
most of the countries that today achieve good scores on the CPI were, at an earlier point in their 
history, afflicted with pervasive public corruption (bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and other 
abuses of public power for private gain), as well as clientalistic political systems rife with pork and 
patronage. Though different in their particulars, many of the leading lights of modern “good gov-
ernance”—countries like Denmark, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States—once bore more than a passing resemblance to modern-day developing countries like Bra-
zil, Indonesia, India, and Nigeria. We do not have an index like the CPI that goes back 200 years, 
but if we did (and if the scale were constant), it is likely that a century or two ago the scores for 
countries that currently do well (like the United States and Sweden) wouldn’t be that different from 
the present-day scores of countries like Brazil and Indonesia.18 
 
So, the set of anticorruption success stories is potentially larger that has been fully appreciated, a 
fact that a small but growing number of scholars have emphasized. (Articles with titles like “Getting 
to Sweden”19 and “Becoming Denmark”20 provide a flavor of this emerging literature.) It is always 
challenging and potentially hazardous to try to draw clear lessons from what happened decades or 
                                                     
12 See Antonio Acconcia & Claudia Cantabene, A Big Push to Deter Corruption: Evidence from Italy, 67 GIORNALE DEGLI 
ECONOMISTI E ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 75 (2008). 
13 See Sofie Arjon Schutte, Against the Odds: Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia, 32 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DE-
VELOPMENT 38 (2012). 
14 See Jung da-Min, “Korea’s Anti-Corruption Efforts an Inspiration for Other Asian Countries,” KOREA TIMES (Dec. 8, 
2019). 
15 See PAUL F. LAGUNES & JAN SVEJNAR EDS., CORRUPTION AND THE LAVA JATO SCANDAL IN LATIN AMERICA (2020). 
16 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019 8-9 (2020). 
17 See Matthew C. Stephenson, “The New Corruption Perceptions Index Identifies Countries with Statistically Signifi-
cant Changes in Perceived Corruption—Should We Credit the Results?,” posted on Global Anticorruption Blog (Mar. 6, 
2018). 
18 See Matt Andrews, The Good Governance Agenda: Beyond Indicators without Theory, 36 OXFORD DEVELOPMENT 
STUDIES 379, 380 (2008) (pointing out that those governments rated as “effective” on current governance indicators 
“looked very different” in the past, when they faced challenges similar to those faced by modern developing countries, 
and “would surely have scored poorly on the current indicators”). 
19 See Bo Rothstein & Jan Teorell, Getting to Sweden, Part II: Breaking with Corruption in the Nineteenth Century, 38 
SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES 238 (2015). 
20 See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Becoming Denmark: Historical Designs of Corruption Control, 80 SOCIAL RESEARCH 1259 
(2013). 
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centuries ago—under quite different social, political, and economic conditions—for modern policy-
making. Yet considering the history of today’s “top performers” can nonetheless make a valuable 
contribution to modern debates about anticorruption reform—not so much by providing simple 
lessons about what policies to adopt, but by offering a broader sense of how the complex process 
of anticorruption reform unfolds over time, and by calling into question certain widely-held beliefs 
about this process. 
 
In this essay, we seek to contribute to this emerging literature by considering the experience of the 
United States.21 We will focus principally on the period between the end of the American Civil War 
in 1865 and the U.S. entry into World War II in 1941, though important parts of the story both 
precede and follow this three-quarter-century period. As several scholars have pointed out (includ-
ing one of us in prior work), the United States, from its founding up into the first half of the twen-
tieth century, can be thought of as a developing country, albeit quite a wealthy one by the standards 
of the time.22 This makes the United States a potentially fruitful subject of study for those inter-
ested in a historical perspective on the challenges facing modern developing countries. The United 
States may be a particularly interesting and relevant case study because the country—in contrast to 
most of the other high-performers on the CPI and other “good governance” indexes—established 
political democracy well before the period of substantial “good government” reforms. By contrast, 
most of the other major Western countries that are today considered both democratic and relatively 
uncorrupt—such as Denmark and Sweden—implemented substantial good governance reforms 
prior to the transition to democracy, and did so in largely top-down fashion.23 For that reason, the 
challenges facing anticorruption reformers in the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century may be more akin to the challenges facing reformers in modern-day democracies 
                                                     
21 In doing so, we build on the work of other scholars who have also explicitly raised the possibility that the U.S. expe-
rience fighting corruption might be relevant to modern developing countries. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia 
Goldin, Corruption and Reform: Introduction, in EDWARD L. GLAESER & CLAUDIA GOLDIN EDS., CORRUPTION AND REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 3, 3 (2006) (“America’s reputation as an untarnished republic is a modern 
phenomenon. Conventional Histories of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America portray its corrupt elements as 
similar, and at times equal, to those found in many of today’s modern transitional economies and developing regions”); 
id. at 4 (“If the United States was once more corrupt than it is today, then America’s history should offer lessons about 
how to reduce corruption”); John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systemic Corruption in American Political and Economic 
History, in. GLAESER & GOLDIN EDS., supra, at 23; SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & BONNE J. PALIFKA, CORRUPTION AND GOVERN-
MENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM, SECOND EDITION (2016) (arguing that “developing countries and those in 
transition can learn from the historical experience of developed countries” such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom). 
22 See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE UNITED STATES AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: STUDIES IN U.S. HISTORY IN THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA AND THE 1920S (1992); Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Margaret Levi & Barry R. Weingast, Twentieth-Century America 
as a Developing Country: Conflict, Institutions, and the Evolution of Public Law, 57 HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION 25 
(2020). As noted in the main text, if one focuses on per capita income—the usual metric by which we distinguish developed 
from developing nations—the characterization of the United States as a developing nation in the nineteenth century may 
seem dubious. According to Angus Maddison’s widely-used estimates, by 1870 per capita GDP in the United States was 
higher than in most other Western European countries (lower than the United Kingdom—the wealthiest country in the 
world at the time—as well as the Netherlands and Belgium, but higher than France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, 
among others) By 1950, U.S. per capita GDP was the highest in the world. See ANGUS MADDISON, COUNTOURS OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY, 1-2008 AD (2007). But widening the focus beyond relative per capita GDP reveals the myriad ways in 
which the nineteenth and even early-twentieth century United States resembled modern developing countries: Putting 
aside relative per capita wealth, absolute national wealth and living standards were still quite low compared to today; the 
country was undergoing rapid industrialization, and with it profound social and demographic change; political institutions 
were weak and unstable, while levels of political violence were high. And perhaps most relevant here, patronage, clien-
talism, nepotism, and self-dealing were widespread. 
23 See Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 20. Rothstein & Teorell, supra note 19. 
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in the developing world, where corruption and democratic politics are deeply enmeshed, and where 
the decision of a single leader or small elite group is typically not sufficient to achieve major, lasting 
change. 
 
We do not attempt, in this short essay, a comprehensive survey of the history of corruption and an-
ticorruption in U.S. history. This story has been partially told elsewhere, though the topic still 
awaits a comprehensive synthesis.24 Nor do we purport to reach firm conclusions about the reasons 
that the U.S. struggle against systemic corruption ultimately succeeded—let alone to draw facile 
“lessons” about “what works” that elide some of the undeniably distinctive features of the Ameri-
can historical journey. Though our objective here is more limited, we think the very distinctiveness 
of the American story underscores the value of attention to historical realities amidst cautious gen-
eralizations, and we hope our foray into this topic will spark deeper exploration. But even our ac-
count here shows how the U.S. experience, when viewed from the metaphorical 30,000 feet, calls 
into question a number of commonly-held views about the struggle against corruption in modern 
developing countries. 
 
First, although some argue that entrenched cultures of corruption are virtually impossible to dis-
lodge, at least within a democratic framework, the U.S. experience demonstrates that it is possible 
for a democratic country to make a transition from a systemically corrupt political system to a sys-
tem in which public corruption, though still present, is aberrational, or at least manageable. This 
may seem like a trivial point, but given the fatalism that sometimes infects discussions of endemic 
corruption in many modern developing countries, demonstrating that the United States (along with 
other countries) made this transition, from a starting point that didn’t look much more favorable 
than what we see in developing countries today, serves an important purpose. 
 
Second, some modern commentators, drawing on game-theoretic models and concepts, have ad-
vanced the claim that a shift from systemic corruption to manageable corruption can occur only 
through a “big bang”—with reforms that are swift, drastic, and coordinated.25 The United States, 
however, does not fit that reform template. Although there were certainly some important bursts of 
reform at certain periods (little bangs? medium bangs?), overall the U.S. transition from a system in 
which corruption was endemic to one in which it was reasonably under control—which, again, we 
date as running roughly from the 1860s through the 1940s, though with important further develop-
ments in the 1960s and 1970s—would be more accurately characterized as incremental, uneven, 
and slow. 
 
                                                     
24 Particularly helpful resources include GLAESER & GOLDIN EDS., supra, note 21; ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN 
AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); MARK W. SUMMERS, THE PLUNDERING GEN-
ERATION: CORRUPTION AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION, 1849-1961 (1987); ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-1883 (1961); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY OF A MORAL IDEA 427-680 (1984); ABRAHAM S. EISENSTADT ET AL. EDS., BEFORE WATERGATE: PROBLEMS OF COR-
RUPTION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1978); Peri E. Arnold, Democracy and Corruption in the 19th Century United States: Par-
ties, “Spoils” and Political Participation, in SEPPO TIIHONEN ED., THE HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
197 (2003).  
25 See Paul Collier, African Growth: Why a “Big Push”?, 15 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMICS 188 (2006); Bo Rothstein, 
Anti-Corruption: The Indirect “Big Bang” Approach, 18 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 228 (2011). 
  7 
Third, in some circles the idea has taken root that fighting corruption requires shrinking the state—
both the scope of government regulatory interventions and the extent of government redistribu-
tion.26 Yet in the United States, the reduction in systemic corruption, especially in the first half of 
the twentieth century, coincided with a substantial expansion of government size and power, espe-
cially at the national level. Indeed, it may be that this expansion, driven by growing citizen demand 
for greater government intervention in the economy, contributed to increasing political pressure to 
control public corruption. To be sure, the relationship between these developments is complicated, 
and teasing out causality is largely beyond what we can hope to accomplish in this essay. Neverthe-
less, these parallel trends at least call into question the simple story that the key to cutting corrup-
tion is cutting “big government”27 or imposing rigid limits on bureaucratic discretion.28 
 
Fourth, perhaps in reaction to an earlier generation’s focus on monitoring and punishment, it has 
recently become fashionable in some quarters to suggest not only that such direct strategies must 
be complemented by broader institutional changes (a proposition that we would endorse), but also 
that measures which target individual wrongdoers—such as criminal prosecutions—do not actually 
do much good in societies where corruption is pervasive.29 On this account, reformers should focus 
exclusively on “fundamental” institutional reforms, and not get distracted trying to push for more 
effective systems of detection and punishment. A somewhat distinct but closely related claim is 
that, when fighting systemic corruption, “direct” strategies—those that explicitly target corrup-
tion—are unlikely to succeed, and that what is needed instead is an “indirect” strategy, one that 
does not specifically target corruption, but rather changes societal conditions and public institutions 
in ways that make corruption harder to sustain.30 On this point, the lessons from U.S. history are 
somewhat more nuanced. Institutional reforms—especially though not exclusively civil service re-
forms—incontrovertibly played a key role in the U.S. fight against corruption. But investigations 
and prosecutions of corrupt actors were also crucial, not only because of the deterrence and inca-
pacitation effects of such measures, but because these enforcement efforts contributed to the credi-
ble signal of a broader shift in political and social norms. And even those reform measures that 
could be characterized as “indirect,” such as civil service reform, were often explicitly packaged and 
promoted as specifically targeting corruption. Speaking more generally, the U.S. experience appears 
to entail a combination of “direct strategies,” such as aggressive law enforcement, and “indirect 
strategies,” such as civil service reform and other institutional changes. 
 
The essay is organized as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of systemic corruption in the 
United States up through the 1870s, emphasizing the extent to which the historical evidence sup-
ports our assertion that corruption in the United States in the decades immediately preceding and 
following the American Civil War, while not on the scale of modern kleptocracies like Equatorial 
                                                     
26 See Gary S. Becker, If You Want To Cut Corruption, Cut Government, Bloomberg (Dec. 11, 1995).  
27 See Gary S. Becker, To Root Out Corruption, Boot Out Big Government, Bloomberg (Jan. 31, 1994). 
28 See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988). 
29 See Adrian Karatnycky & Alexander J. Motyl, How Western Anticorruption Policy Is Failing Ukraine: It Should Focus 
on Institutions, Not Individuals, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 29, 2018). 
30 See Bo Rothstein, Fighting Systemic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy, 147 DAEDELUS 35 (2018). 
  8 
Guinea or Venezuela, appears to have been at least roughly comparable to the widespread corrup-
tion we see in modern developing-world democracies like Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and 
Ukraine. Part II then traces major developments in the U.S. fight against corruption from prelimi-
nary steps in the 1850s up through the New Deal period in the 1930s, with some brief mention of 
further developments in the latter part of the twentieth century. In Part III, we consider whether or 
how this admittedly superficial sketch of U.S. history sheds light on several questions in the current 
debates over anticorruption strategy in modern developing and transition countries: first, whether 
successfully disrupting endemic corruption requires a “big bang” approach; second, whether the 
most effective way to counter systemic corruption is to reduce the size and scope of government; 
and third, whether criminal prosecutions and other “direct” enforcement strategies can help reduce 
corruption, or whether only “structural” reforms can be effective when corruption is entrenched.  
While mindful of the difficulties with drawing simple lessons from a single historical case, we sug-
gest that U.S. history provides evidence that seems inconsistent with some of the conclusions and 
recommendations that scholars have reached with respect to each of these questions. While we 
would not go so far as to argue that the U.S. experience refutes those claims, we do think that the 
U.S. historical experience suggests the need for more critical scrutiny. More broadly, we suggest 
that the careful study of the history of the fight against systemic corruption in modern Western 
countries can shed light on continuing the struggle against systemic corruption throughout the 
world. 
 
I. Systemic Corruption In the Nineteenth Century United States 
 
Let’s make one thing clear at the outset: The United States has not “solved” corruption. Corruption 
remains an important problem in all levels and branches of American government, and in all areas 
of the country. And this is so even if we bracket the suggestion that certain forms of currently law-
ful lobbying, campaign finance, and other influence activities might plausibly be characterized as 
“corrupt.”31 Corruption scandals regularly make headlines.32 The U.S. Department of Justice has an 
entire division devoted to the prosecution of public corruption, and that division has plenty of 
work.33 And the last several years have seen a resurgence of concerns about corruption and con-
flicts of interest at the highest levels of the U.S. federal government.34 
 
Nevertheless, the nature of the corruption problem in American government today is quite differ-
ent from the nature of the corruption problem in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, India, 
                                                     
31 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). 
32 See, e.g., “‘It’s the Human Way’: Corruption Scandals Play Out in Big Cities Across U.S.”, New York Times (Feb. 5, 
2019); “Ohio Speaker’s Arrest in Bribery Probe Muddies 2020 Election.” Washington Post (July 22, 2020); “North Carolina 
G.O.P. Chairman Indicted in Corruption Probe,” New York Times (April 2, 2019). 
33 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEG-
RITY SECTION FOR 2016 21-22 (2016) (table showing that between 1997 and 2016, the Section secured convictions of 
nearly 8,000 federal officials and nearly 2,000 state officials, as well as over 4,700 local officials, for public corruption, 
along with over 5,000 private citizens involved in public corruption offenses. Some have plausibly argued that the Depart-
ment of Justice data is over-inclusive, see Adriana S. Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring Public Corruption in the United 
States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions, 18 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 127 (2016), but even taking 
that into account, it’s clear that corruption in the United States is by no means a thing of the past. 
34 See “Tracking Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in the Trump Administration,” posted on Global Anticorruption 
Blog. 
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Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Ukraine, and dozens of others. In those 
countries, commentators—both domestic and international—diagnose a “culture of corruption,” 
where corrupt networks function as the country’s primary “operating system.”35 This reality is re-
flected in international indexes like the CPI, which, for all of its well-documented shortcomings,36 
plausibly finds that the United States is perceived as much less corrupt than most other countries.37 
It’s all relative, but on the whole—at least if we put to one side legitimate concerns about the 
Trump Administration’s transgression of longstanding integrity norms—public corruption in the 
United States is episodic rather than systemic; it is aberrational, rather than “just the way things 
work.”38 There are, of course, important modern exceptions—particular jurisdictions or bureaus 
where corruption is systematic and entrenched. The New York City Police Department in the 
1960s is one infamous modern example;39 a more recent example is the Department of the Inte-
rior’s Minerals Management Service in the 2000s.40 And, as just mentioned, the Trump Administra-
tion is notable for its seemingly flagrant disregard for ethical norms relating to matters of self-deal-
ing and conflict of interest.41 But these examples are notable in part because they are exceptional, 
and for that reason especially shocking. 
 
It is sometimes tempting to ascribe cross-country differences in government corruption to deeply 
entrenched cultural differences, or perhaps to profound differences in historical experiences—dif-
ferences that are, for all intents and purposes, “fixed” features of different societies, changeable 
only by the operation of deep social and economic forces over centuries, and not susceptible to 
conscious policy interventions. That fatalistic view is buttressed by the observation that corruption 
(or its inverse, integrity) can be a self-reinforcing social equilibrium: When corruption is widespread 
in a society, people in that society may have stronger incentives to engage in corruption; any single 
individual may feel that it’s pointless to act honestly when everyone else is corrupt, and organizing 
collective action among very large numbers of uncoordinated individuals is unrealistic.42 On this 
view, a country that has inherited a deeply rooted “culture of corruption” has had a stroke of bad 
                                                     
35 See SARAH CHAYES, WHEN CORRUPTION IS THE OPERATING SYSTEM: THE CASE OF HONDURAS (2017). 
36 See, e.g., Dan Hough, “Here’s this year’s (flawed) Corruption Perceptions Index. Those flaws are useful.”, posted on 
The Monkey Cage blog, Washington Post (Jan. 27, 2016); Paul Heywood, “The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): the 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” posted on the British Academy blog (Feb. 3, 2016). 
37 In the most recent CPI, for 2019, the US received a score of 69 out of 100, tying it with France for 23rd place in the 
ranking of 180 countries. (It’s worth noting that the U.S. score and rank appear lower in the last couple of years, which 
may be a function of the Trump Administration, but might also just be statistical noise.) By comparison, the scores and 
ranks for some of the major democracies in the developing world were as follows: Malaysia (53/100, ranked 51st); Argen-
tina (45/100, ranked 66th); South Africa (44/100, ranked 70th); India (41/100, ranked 80th); Indonesia (30/100, ranked 85th); 
Brazil (35/100, ranked 106th); Philippines (34/100, ranked 113th); Ukraine (30/100, ranked 126th); Mexico (29/100, ranked 
130th); Nigeria (26/100, ranked 146th). 
38 See ROSE-ACKERMAN & PALIFKA, supra note 21, at 422 (observing that although concerns persist in the United States 
over “the role of wealth in subverting public power,” the focus of these concerns is on things like “campaign funding, 
aggressive lobbying, conflicts of interest, and the revolving door, not the outright siphoning off of public funds by politi-
cians,” and while bribery does take place, “such payoffs are not systemic, seldom enrich top federal politicians, and are 
punished”). 
39 See WHITMAN KNAPP ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED POLICE CORRUPTION (1972). 
40 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF 
OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 76-79 (2011). 
41 See “Tracking Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in the Trump Administration,” posted on Global Anticorruption Blog 
(https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/profiting-from-the-presidency-tracking-corruption-and-conflicts-in-the-trump-admin-
istration/) (last viewed Aug. 6,2020). 
42 See Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein & Jan Teorell, Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collec-
tive Action Problem, 26 GOVERNANCE 449 (2012). 
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luck—like being landlocked or located in the tropics—that cannot really be changed, but must in-
stead be worked around. And while efforts to keep the problem at bay may be worthwhile, funda-
mentally changing the culture seems hopeless. 
 
Yet it is precisely that fatalistic attitude that the U.S. experience over the course of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century calls into question, for the simple reason that 150 years ago, 
American government, especially though not exclusively at the state and local levels, appeared to be 
mired in the same sort of entrenched, systemic corruption—corruption as the operating system—
that we see in many developing countries today.43 The pervasiveness of (then-legal) patronage and 
clientelism in U.S. government, along with numerous examples of egregious high-level (illegal) cor-
ruption, suggest a polity more similar to modern-day Argentina than to modern-day Sweden. 
Political corruption was widespread in the American colonies before the Revolution,44 and per-
vaded American politics from the beginning of the Republic. Although venal corruption appears to 
have been relatively rare at the highest levels of the national government during the administrations 
of the first four U.S. presidents (Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison),45 grand corruption 
at the state level was a serious problem. As is true in many developing countries today, much of the 
most egregious corruption in the early American Republic involved the sale of state-owned re-
sources—especially land—to unscrupulous private interests. The most notorious example from this 
period is the so-called Yazoo scandal. In 1795, a consortium of private investors bribed Georgia 
state legislators to enact a law that conveyed to the investors, for absurdly low prices, approximately 
35 million acres of state-owned land north of the Yazoo River. Though public outrage led to the 
election of a new set of Georgia legislators in 1796, nobody involved in the Yazoo scandal was ever 
prosecuted, in part because Georgia had no state law against bribery at the time.46 Though the Ya-
zoo scandal is the most well-known example of this sort of dirty dealing, it was hardly an anom-
aly.47 
 
And the problem only got worse—or at least more widespread and conspicuous—during the presi-
dency of James Monroe (1817-1825), a period that is sometimes known (misleadingly) as the “Era 
of Good Feelings.” As is true in many developing countries today, the massive corruption of this 
period was largely a product of the rapid growth that accompanied industrialization, coupled with 
the important role of government in regulating the economy and supplying infrastructure and other 
                                                     
43 SEE ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 384 (1988) (noting that, from the 
Colonial period up through Reconstruction, “bribery, fraud, and influence peddling have been endemic to American poli-
tics”). 
44 See Edwin G. Burrows, “Corruption in Government,” in JACK P. GREENE ED., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
HISTORY VOL. 1 417, 417-20 (1984); SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 8; Morton Keller, “Corruption in America: Continuity and 
Change,” in ABRAHAM S. EISENSTADT ET AL. EDS., BEFORE WATERGATE: PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
7-9 (1978); James T. Kloppenberg, in Interchange: Corruption Has a History, 105 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 912, 
918 (2019). 
45 See Burrows, supra note 44, at 424-25. 
46 See NOONAN, supra note 24, at 435-37; TEACHOUT, supra note 24, at 81-101. After the 1796 election, the new Georgia 
legislature enacted a new bill purporting to nullify the sale, a decision that triggered lengthy litigation culminating in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1810 decision in Fletcher v. Peck. While interesting and important in its own right, this subsequent 
history is not directly relevant here. 
47 Bank chartering was another significant source of corruption during the first generation after the ratification of the 
Constitution. See SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 9. 
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public goods, as well as a weak institutional framework.48 The corruption during this period in-
volved officials at the highest levels of the federal and state governments, and staggering sums of 
money.49 As one historian summed it up, “many men in Washington regularly plundered the treas-
ury…. Those who disbursed funds or otherwise handled public money skimmed off a little some-
thing for themselves as a regular matter…. Congressmen were probably the worst offenders, at 
least in terms of the amount of money they pocketed…. Numerous congressmen took money from 
corporations to advance the interests of these companies through favorable legislation or other 
government actions.”50 So bad was the corruption of the time that this historian suggested that ra-
ther than being known as the Era of Good Feelings, this period should really be known as the na-
tion’s first Era of Corruption.51 
 
Things did not get much better over the next generation. While Andrew Jackson was outraged by 
the corruption of the Monroe era (in part for personal political reasons52), during his presidency 
(1829-1837) corruption pervaded “every facet” of political life.53 Perhaps most notably, President 
Jackson entrenched the so-called “spoils system” in the federal civil service. Though framed as an 
anti-elitist measure to break the power of what certain modern commentators might call the “deep 
state,” the expansion of partisan control over government appointments proved fertile ground for 
pervasive corruption—a result that observers of patronage politics in today’s developing countries 
would find wholly unsurprising.54 One particularly sharp critic wrote in 1854 that the Jacksonian 
spoils system was “[t]hat deadly element” that rendered the U.S. political system “so exquisitely vi-
cious, that thenceforth it worked to corruption by an irresistible necessity…. [The spoils system] 
has made the word office-holder synonymous with the word sneak [and] … has thronged the capital 
with greedy sycophants.”55 
 
The expansion of the spoils system is closely associated with President Jackson specifically—for 
good reason. But the emergence of this system may also have had something to do with broader 
changes in U.S. politics during this time, particularly the rise of “mass-based political parties”; be-
cause “[o]rganizing the huge electorate to win frequent political campaigns required great efforts 
and contributions by a host of devoted party workers,” parties naturally came to see civil servants 
as the “most obvious source of workers and money[.]”56 Moreover, in addition to the changes asso-
ciated with the rise of the spoils system, there’s little evidence that the pervasive corruption that 
                                                     
48 See Burrows, supra note 44, at 426 (1984); ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN 
FREEDOM, 1822-1832, VOL. 2 13 (1981). 
49 REMINI, supra note 48, at 13. 
50 REMINI, supra note 48, at 14. 
51 REMINI, supra note 48, at 13. 
52 Jackson believed, possibly for good reason, that he had lost the contested election of 1824 to John Quincy Adams 
because Adams had bribed key electors. See FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEG-
RITY: HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 10 (1996).  
53 Edward Pessen, “Corruption and the Politics of Pragmatism: Reflections on the Jacksonian Era,” in ABRAHAM S. 
EISENSTADT ET AL. EDS., BEFORE WATERGATE: PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 79, 82 (1978); ROSE-
ACKERMAN & PALIFKA, supra note 21, at 423. 
54 See TEACHOUT, supra note 24, at 81-101 at 175-76; Pessen, supra note 53, at 83-86. 
55 James Parton, The Life of Horace Greeley, Editor of the New York Tribune (1854) p. 100. 
56 Ari Hoogenboom, “Civil Service Reform,” in JACK P. GREENE ED., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 
VOL. 1 233, 233 (1984) 
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characterized the Era of Good Feelings dissipated during the Jackson administration, notwithstand-
ing Jackson’s condemnations. Indeed, during the Jacksonian period corruption of various kinds re-
mained “remarkably widespread.”57 
 
Some historians do see the post-Jacksonian 1840s as perhaps somewhat less corrupt than the pre-
ceding decades, though the feeling was not necessarily shared by many at the time. (The Scottish 
journalist Alexander Mackay reported that during his travels in the United States in 1846-47, he had 
“heard several Americans declare[] that they believe their own government to be the most corrupt 
on earth.”58) Whether or not the 1840s were marginally better than the preceding decades, any hope 
that the U.S. government had started to progress beyond systemic corruption was dispelled by the 
rampant corruption of the 1850s. “[T]he evidence is overwhelming,” one historian writes, that 
“[t]he 1850s were as depraved as any other age and, at least from the evidence available to histori-
ans, far more debauched than the 1840s.”59 Much, though not all, of this corruption was associated 
with significant government infrastructure projects, such as railroads and canals.60 Land speculation 
and the growth and professionalization of political party machines also played a role.61 
 
This rampant corruption was noted and lamented by critics, both foreign and domestic. In 1858, a 
local newspaper editor who visited Washington, D.C. wrote that he was shocked by the brazen and 
routinized buying and selling of offices carried out by party leaders in the U.S. Senate, the White 
House, and various government departments, with “the actual sum of money to be paid for an of-
fice … as publicly named … as the prices of dry goods are named between a dealer … and his cus-
tomers.”62 Some Washington insiders had a similarly despondent view: Also in 1858, Georgia Sena-
tor Robert Toombs complained that while Americans may “speak of the corruptions of Mexico, of 
Spain, of France, … I do not believe to-day there is as corrupt a Government under the heavens as 
these United States.”63 Critics from the other side of the Atlantic shared this assessment. William 
Edward Baxter, a British Member of Parliament who traveled widely in the United States, wrote in 
1855 about the pervasive corruption not only in Washington D.C. but in state and local govern-
ments as well. Writing about New York in particular, Baxter observed that “offices and favours 
were there openly bought and sold; that aldermen and councilmen accepted these situations for the 
avowed purpose of getting quickly rich; and that jobs every week were there perpetrated with impu-
nity which in [Great Britain] would bring disgrace to every person connected with them. I believe 
that as great corruption exists in [New York] as was ever brought to light in the days of the Stu-
arts[.]”64 Another British politician, Henry George Grey, 3rd Earl Grey, invoked the United States in 
                                                     
57 See Pessen, supra note 53, at 80. See also id. at 84 (describing the level of political corruption as “inordinately high 
during the Jacksonian era”). 
58 ALEXANDER MACKAY, THE WESTERN WORLD: OR, TRAVELS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1846-47, VOL. 1 166 (1849). Mac-
kay made this passing remark in the context of competition for federal patronage appointments (or “jobbing”). 
59 SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 14. See also id. at 167 (in the 1850s, the available evidence tells “a devastating story of 
public officials and party hacks who abused their authority to line their pockets or thwart the democratic process…. Cor-
ruption had grown as the nation grew[.]”).  That corruption, however, was not evenly distributed throughout the country; it 
was worse in some places than in others. See id. At xii-xiii. 
60 See SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 17; Burrows, supra note 44, at 426. 
61 See SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 17; Burrows, supra note 44, at 426. 
62 SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 29. 
63 Quoted in SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 7. 
64 WILLIAM EDWARD BAXTER, AMERICA AND THE AMERICANS 59 (1855). 
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an 1858 tract as a cautionary example of the baleful effects of excessive democracy. In the United 
States, Grey alleged, “[t]he management of public affairs is thrown into the hands of men selected 
for employment without regard to their fitness; the grossest corruption notoriously prevailing, both 
in making appointments to office and in the general conduct of public business, whether by the 
Federal Government, or by the State or Municipal authorities. Even the administration of justice is 
infected with the taint, and fails to command the confidence of the Public for its impartiality and 
fairness.”65 
 
Allegations of corruption in the administration of President James Buchanan (1857-1861) led to the 
formation, in 1860, of a House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate Alleged Corrup-
tions in Government. This committee was known as the Covode Committee after its chair, Repre-
sentative John Covode. Though the Covode Committee was criticized by President Buchanan and 
his allies—with some justification—as partisan, the committee nonetheless uncovered “the most 
devastating proof of government abuse of power since the founding of the Republic.” 66 Although 
the Covode Committee did not find that President Buchanan had personally committed any crimi-
nal or impeachable offense, “members of both parties were stunned at the depth of the corruption 
that the President had permitted or inspired.”67 
 
Such bipartisan condemnation underscores how, on the eve of the American Civil War, corruption 
appeared to pervade all levels of the U.S. government. Systemic corruption persisted, and if any-
thing became more virulent, during the post-war Reconstruction period—a period that one histo-
rian suggests could also be called “The Era of Good Stealings.”68 The roots of this corruption will 
sound familiar, both from the descriptions of U.S. corruption in prior eras, and from more contem-
porary examples in modern developing and transition countries. In the Reconstruction South, 
“[o]fficials regularly handled unprecedented sums of money, corporations vied for the benefits of 
state aid, and communities competed for routes that would supposedly guarantee their future pros-
perity—conditions that offered numerous opportunities for bribery and plunder.”69 The problem 
was by no means confined to the South—corruption was also endemic in the North and West, as 
well as in the federal government.70 As a good-government reform advocate lamented in an 1868 
magazine article, “At present there is no organization save that of corruption; no system save that 
of chaos; no test of integrity save that of partisanship; no test of qualification save that of in-
trigue.”71 This was probably an exaggeration,72 not much different from modern hyperbolic claims 
                                                     
65 EARL GREY, PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO A REFORM IN PARLIAMENT: AN ESSAY 136-
38 (1858). 
66 SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 258-59. 
67 SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 258-59. 
68 See SUMMERS, supra note 1. 
69 FONER, supra note 43, at 385. See also id. at 389 (noting that “corruption threatened to undermine the integrity of 
Reconstruction itself, not simply in the eyes of Southern opponents but in the court of Northern public opinion”). 
70 FONER, supra note 43, at 465-67. 
71 HOOGENBOOM, supra note 24, at 1 (quoting Julius Bing, Our Civil Service, PUTNAM’S MAGAZINE, II, No. 8 (August 
1868), 233, 236.) 
72 Indeed, while corruption in the post-civil war period was indeed widespread, three was also a familiar tendency in 
this period to make hyperbolic, and often politically motivated, claims about just how bad the problem was. See SUMMERS, 
supra note 1, at x. 
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that in this or that developing country “all government officials” are corrupt.73 The civil service in 
the post-Civil War period “would not have functioned at all if corruption and incompetence were 
as universal as reformers alleged.”74 Still, it seems fair to conclude that during this period “profes-
sionalism was almost nonexistent in the civil service, and politics permeated it to the core.”75 
 
While the corruption associated with patronage politics was a substantial concern in the post-Civil 
War period, much as it had been in the pre-Civil War period, a great deal of the corruption in the 
decades following the Civil War was associated with the most significant technological and eco-
nomic development of the era: the rapid expansion of railroads.76 Railroad companies were private, 
but they relied on various forms of government aid and approvals, and this, coupled with the vast 
amounts of money involved in railroad development, was a recipe for grand corruption not so dif-
ferent from what one observes in major infrastructure projects in the modern developing world. 
There are countless examples of railroad-related corruption during the 1870s,77 but by far the most 
infamous was the so-called Credit Mobilier scandal. The scheme, which was hatched in 1864, was 
somewhat complex, but essentially it involved self-dealing by major stockholders in the Union Pa-
cific Railroad company, the private firm that the federal government had chartered—and heavily 
subsidized—to build a portion of the transcontinental railroad. These shareholders created a sham 
construction company, which they named “Credit Mobilier,” and then arranged for Union Pacific 
to enter into construction contracts with Credit Mobilier, which charged Union Pacific exorbitant 
prices for the work. Basically, the architects of the scheme were paying themselves and other Credit 
Mobilier shareholders with Union Pacific money—which was largely taxpayer money, given the 
substantial federal subsidies for railroad construction. Starting in 1867, the ringleaders sought to 
protect their scheme, and to secure more funding for Union Pacific, by bribing congressmen and 
other politicians with cash and heavily discounted shares of Credit Mobilier stock. A newspaper 
broke the story in 1872, while President Grant was running for reelection, and the media coverage 
prompted a congressional investigation. That investigation ultimately led to the expulsion of two 
Members of Congress, and badly damaged the reputations of several other leading political figures 
of the day.78 
 
The Credit Mobilier affair was the most prominent corruption scandal of President Grant’s first 
term. The most prominent and politically damaging corruption episode of President Grant’s second 
term was the “Whiskey Ring” scandal, which was essentially a tax evasion scheme. Treasury Secre-
tary Benjamin Bristow launched investigations that produced evidence that a coalition of distillers, 
                                                     
73 See Matthew C. Stephenson, “Watch Your Language: Not ‘Everyone’ Is Corrupt—Anywhere,” posted on Global An-
ticorruption Blog (Aug. 23, 2016).  
74 HOOGENBOOM, supra note 24, at 1. 
75 HOOGENBOOM, supra note 24, at 1. 
76 FONER, supra note 43, at 386, 465, 467-68. 
77 To note just a few: In the Reconstruction South, a ring headed by a couple of private businessmen distributed roughly 
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shopkeepers, and corrupt government agents had colluded to defraud the U.S. government of mil-
lions of dollars in taxes. The fact that the Whiskey Ring was uncovered by the executive branch, 
acting on its own initiative, rather than by media disclosures, makes this scandal somewhat unusual 
for the time. Also unusually for the time, the Whiskey Ring scandal led to criminal prosecutions, 
and over a hundred participants in the scheme were eventually convicted. However, when Secretary 
Bristow’s investigations started leading him to senior officials more closely connected to the Grant 
Administration, he came under increasing pressure to drop the cases; his situation became so un-
tenable that he eventually resigned.79 
 
In addition to high-profile corruption scandals at the federal level, significant corruption continued 
at the state and local level as well. Indeed, during this period, “[a]lthough corruption occurred on 
the federal level of government, it was on the state and municipal levels that it became most blatant 
and common.”80 Back in 1855, as noted earlier, William Baxter had been appalled by the avarice 
and impunity of New York City’s politicians, and the overt purchase and sale of public offices.81 
One wonders what he would have thought of New York politics in the late 1860s and 1870s, a time 
when “the votes of New York legislators were bought and sold like ‘meat in the market,’” and 
when it was “impossible to pass a bill unless a high percentage of the legislators had been pur-
chased[.]”82 
 
Much of this state and local corruption was connected to the rise, over the latter part of the nine-
teenth century, of more sophisticated and organized political machines. In New York City, the fig-
ure most associated with the systemic corruption of this period was “Boss” William Tweed, who 
transformed a politically influential social club called Tammany Hall into what some historians 
characterize as the first urban political machine.83 The model—which had its roots in the pre-Civil 
War “spoils system” and spread to many other states and cities throughout the 1870s and 1880s84—
had corruption down to a science: 
 
The organization, or machine, in return for getting out the vote, received exclusive control of gov-
ernment appointments and programs within its territory…. Its placemen and dependents in turn 
handed back a fixed percentage of their official salaries to the organization and split with it any 
kickbacks, rake-offs, shares, or bribes that their ingenuity could devise with outside interests. The 
resulting stream of [corrupt revenue] … then passed down through a well-defined corporate hierar-
chy [of machine apparatchiks] …, who completed the cycle by distributing the gifts and favors that 
ensured voter loyalty and brought victory on election day. It was all … ruthlessly efficient and disci-
plined.85 
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Boss Tweed himself proved too greedy for his own good, even by the standards of the time. Be-
tween 1867 and 1871, he and his cronies stole somewhere between $40 million and $410 million 
from New York City’s public coffers. When the scale of this theft was disclosed in 1871 by a rival 
politician who had managed to get hold of the city’s account books and leaked them a newspaper, 
Tweed’s ring collapsed and Tweed himself went to jail, where he died in 1878.86 But the urban po-
litical machine, and its associated corruption, persisted in many American cities well into the twenti-
eth century.87 
 
The point of this brief historical overview is simple but nonetheless important.  In the decades im-
mediately preceding and immediately following the U.S. Civil war, corruption in the United States 
was deeply entrenched in society, and just as deeply enmeshed with the political system. Rapid eco-
nomic expansion, coupled with massive publicly subsidized infrastructure projects, took place in an 
environment with relatively weak political institutions, as well as a legal framework that was incom-
plete on paper and under-enforced in practice. The need to run broad-based election campaigns 
that mobilized large numbers of voters—many of them lower income, relatively uneducated, and 
without a robust social safety net—fostered patronage systems that weakened the capacity of the 
public service and allowed widespread theft and misappropriation of public resources. The United 
States, in both the pre-Civil War 1850s and the post-Civil War 1870s, looked a lot like many mod-
ern developing and transition countries in terms of the extent to which corruption was both sys-
temic and intertwined with the operation of the political system. 
 
There are, to be sure, important differences between the mid-nineteenth century United States and 
modern developing and transition countries. For one thing, as noted above, even by the standards 
of the time the nineteenth-century United States was quite wealthy. For another, despite the wide-
spread corruption of the period, it does not appear that any nineteenth-century U.S. president was 
personally corrupt. And although legal and judicial institutions were incomplete and often under-
enforced, at least at the federal level it seems that, for the most part, these institutions were reason-
ably effective. Nevertheless, despite these important differences, the available evidence all suggests 
that, as historians of the period have concluded, corruption “thoroughly permeated American poli-
tics and government in the nineteenth century,”88 and, by the latter part of that century, corruption 
had emerged as “the central issue of American political life and thought.”89 The nature and extent 
of the systemic corruption that pervaded U.S. politics and government during this time was strik-
ingly similar to what one finds in modern developing and transition countries.90 
That simple observation is a corrective to the cynicism, fatalism, and cultural determinism that 
sometimes creep into discussions of the challenges associated with fighting systemic corruption in 
the modern developing world. Systemic corruption is, admittedly, frustratingly resilient. Moreover, 
when corruption is part and parcel of how the political system operates—when it’s the “way things 
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get done”—it is tempting to conclude that, absent some massive disruption, there’s no way to 
change the system. It’s also tempting to ascribe systemic corruption to deep-rooted cultural traits—
something in the attitudes, beliefs, or values of the people that makes them willing to tolerate or 
even to embrace corrupt practices. There was some of that in the nineteenth century United States 
as well: Many observers, both domestic and foreign, attributed pervasive American corruption to 
deep-rooted cultural and moral failings, especially materialism, pathological individualism, and ad-
miration of amoral cleverness.91 More generally, the kind of systemic corruption that historians 
have documented in the United States in the decades before and after the Civil War could easily 
have led an observer at the time to be pessimistic, and perhaps hopeless, about the possibility for 
meaningful change. 
 
Yet change did come. In the next section, we sketch out some of the most important changes that 
took place in the United States with respect to corruption and anticorruption from the mid-nine-
teenth century to the mid-twentieth century. For now, the simple but important point we want to 
emphasize is that a dramatic transition—a change that more pessimistic Americans and foreign ob-
servers at the time might have thought impossible—took place. Indeed, as other scholars have em-
phasized, “American history … provide[s] a striking story of a country that changed from a place 
where political bribery was a routine event infecting politics at all levels to a nation that now ranks 
among the least corrupt in the world.”92 While there is still too much corruption in the United 
States, there was clearly a dramatic transformation between the mid-nineteenth century and the 
mid-twentieth century, a shift from systemic corruption (corruption as the “operating system”) to 
aberrational corruption. For modern developing countries, there are two simple and related lessons 
to draw from this. 
 
First, we should be skeptical of arguments that assert that contemporary practices are the inevitable 
consequences of deep structural or cultural forces. That is not to deny the relevance of culture or 
long-term historical forces in shaping political outcomes. But we should keep in mind that to an 
American citizen in 1870, especially one living in a city dominated by a political machine, it may 
well have seemed that corruption was inexorably woven into the fabric of American political life, a 
part of the “culture.” We should be cautious about constructing “Just So” stories about why and 
how current practices and institutions are the inevitable consequence of forces beyond our control. 
Second, U.S. history demonstrates that the transition from a state of systemic, entrenched corruption 
to a state of limited, aberrational corruption is possible.93 That point alone might not seem terribly 
satisfying, as we still want to know how such a transition can be achieved, and whether U.S. history 
offers any lessons on that question for other polities. Yet we shouldn’t underestimate the im-
portance of simply demonstrating the possibility of change. Endemic corruption feeds on hopeless-
ness; the fatalistic belief that nothing can be done about systemic corruption can be self-fulfilling.  
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In that sense, the observation that the United States and other countries succeeded in making this 
transition is significant to the contemporary struggle against corruption in the developing world. 
 
II. Anticorruption Reform in the United States, 1865-1940 (and Beyond) 
 
We cannot and will not try to provide anything like an in-depth survey of over 75 years of Ameri-
can history (really more, since the transformation continued at least through the 1970s). Neverthe-
less, to give a sense of how (and perhaps why) things changed in the United States, this section will 
provide a brief sketch of the timeline of the reform process, highlighting the most important devel-
opments in the U.S. fight against corruption. 
 
Though our main focus will be on the period between 1865 and 1941, important first steps toward 
significant anticorruption reform took place in the 1850s, notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) 
the egregious corruption of that period. At the federal level, in 1853 Congress enacted the first fed-
eral statute explicitly prohibiting the bribery of Members of Congress. 94 That law, which had been 
prompted by a scandal concerning the handling of claims related to the Mexican-American War, 
was further strengthened in 1862, partly due to concerns over war profiteering.95 (The law, how-
ever, was not terribly effective, and no convictions were obtained under it before the twentieth cen-
tury.96) Also in 1853, in response to worries about the excessive influence of paid lobbyists—some 
of them sitting congressmen—Congress adopted new rules that, among other things, prevented 
members of Congress from acting as agents for private claimants.97 
 
The 1850s also saw some important reforms on the state level—reforms which, though not explic-
itly or exclusively about “corruption,” addressed more general concerns about improper private in-
fluence on policymaking, especially the legislative process. In the early nineteenth century, much 
state legislative activity consisted not of enacting general laws, but rather of passing private bills to 
benefit specific people, firms, or groups. (Corporate charters, for example, were granted by the leg-
islature to individual firms.) Lobbying for these sorts of private bills was widely perceived as cor-
rupt, whether or not actual bribery took place. Popular revulsion at these practices led most states, 
starting with Indiana in 1851, to amend their constitutions to limit the ability of the state legisla-
tures to enact many types of private bills, including corporate charters.98 (No such prohibitions ap-
plied to the U.S. Congress, though some have suggested that the states’ constitutional amendments 
helped shift norms concerning appropriate legislative behavior.99) 
 
The incremental progress that began in the 1850s continued in the post-Civil War period. At the 
state level, the (accurate) perception that railroad companies were among the leading corruptors of 
state legislators contributed to the passage of laws in several states that established independent 
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commissions to regulate railroads, taking this power away from the state legislatures. While the 
main objective of these so-called “Granger Laws” was to end railroad rate discrimination and 
thereby to secure more favorable rates for farmers, the creation of these independent commissions 
was also meant to curb the bribery and other corrupt practices that railroad companies had em-
ployed to ensure favorable treatment by state legislatures. As one historian put it, “Since railroads 
were among the leading corrupters of Gilded Age legislatures, the creation of railroad commissions 
was in part a reaction to that corruption…. Reformers hoped that energetic and capable railroad 
commissioners, enjoying a longer tenure of office than legislators, would be able either through 
publicity or regulation to eliminate railroads’ corrupt political and business practices. The main ob-
jective was to end rate discrimination, but the desire to stop railroads from corrupting legislatures 
was real.”100 
 
At the federal level, another important legal change addressed concerns about extortionate corrup-
tion in the customs service. The main target of this reform was what was known as the “moiety” 
system for enforcing customs duties. Under this system, if an informant revealed an importer’s fail-
ure to pay customs duties, the importer’s entire shipment (not just the specific items on which the 
duty was owed) would be forfeited, and the proceeds from the sale of the forfeited goods would be 
divided equally among the informant, the government treasury, and the customs officials of the 
port.101 On its face, this might sound like an efficient way to leverage private information and pri-
vate incentives to more effectively detect and deter tariff evasion. The problem, however, was that 
“exceedingly complex import laws” enabled customs officials to find minor technical violations and 
either to seize the shipment (and pocket a substantial portion of the proceeds) or to extort bribes 
not to do so (pocketing some of the money they made and using the rest of it to fill their political 
party’s coffers).102 Merchants’ complaints about such abuses, coupled with several embarrassing 
public scandals, eventually prompted Congress to enact an 1874 reform bill that eliminated the 
moiety system, replacing it with a system in which failure to pay duties could result in confiscation 
only if a court found intent to defraud, and forfeiture was limited to the smuggled items rather than 
an entire shipment.103 The elimination of the moiety system was seen as an important step toward 
cracking down on corruption in customs administration. On top of that, President Hayes ordered 
sweeping investigations into corruption in customs offices throughout the country in 1877. 104 (In 
addition to their other consequences, these investigations led President Hayes to dismiss future 
President Chester Arthur from his position as customs collector for New York, a setback that 
clearly did not derail Arthur’s political career.105) 
 
These reforms were small but important, as were a number of other changes that occurred during 
this period.106 Also, as noted above, Treasury Secretary Bristow’s investigations into the Whiskey 
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Ring scheme led to prosecutions and over 100 convictions. While the prosecutions of those too 
close to President Grant were stymied, the Whiskey Ring prosecutions were nevertheless important 
both in exposing corruption and demonstrating that determined investigators and prosecutors 
could disrupt and dismantle corrupt networks. But by far the most significant development of the 
post-Civil War generation, with respect to the fight against corruption and patronage, was the 
movement toward civil service reform. 
 
Notwithstanding considerable hostility to the Jacksonian spoils system, meaningful civil service re-
form wasn’t really on the public agenda prior to the Civil War. The war, however, both increased 
the size of the federal bureaucracy and exposed the problems with the spoils system.107 As a result, 
interest in reforming the federal civil service to create something more along the lines of the British 
or continental European model started to emerge even before the war was over.108 Indeed, Rhode 
Island Congressman Thomas Jenckes, known as the “father of civil service reform,” introduced his 
first reform bill in December 1865, barely seven months after the Civil War ended.109 That bill was 
not enacted, and didn’t receive much support outside of a small circle, but over the course of the 
Reconstruction era, support for civil service reform gradually expanded.”110 
 
There were some encouraging signs about the prospects for civil service reform early in the Grant 
Administration, most notably President Grant’s creation of a Civil Service Commission in 1871. 
Though that commission had only advisory powers, it released a lengthy and influential report con-
demning the spoils system and advancing a set of substantive recommendations for reform.111 Fur-
thermore, although efforts to push through legislation modeled on Congressman Jenckes bill 
stalled, the early 1870s did see some modest internal reforms within the executive branch.112 
 
Nevertheless, progress was halting and uneven. Broad and ambitious recommendations, along the 
lines proposed by the Civil Service Commission, provoked significant resistance, including from 
within Grant’s own party. While a sustained and unified campaign for civil service reform might 
have succeeded, supporters of such reform fractured into three different camps in the 1872 elec-
tion, and these internal divisions so weakened the reform movement that the reformers were una-
ble to stop President Grant from capitulating to reform opponents.113 The movement for civil ser-
vice reform was further undermined by an economic crisis in 1873, which pushed the issue off the 
public agenda.114 By 1875 the prospects for meaningful civil service reform looked as bleak as they 
had when Congressman Jenckes introduced his first reform bill a decade earlier.115 
But the civil service reform movement rebounded after 1875, with new leadership and an infusion 
of energy and popular support.116 The reformers saw some modest gains the Hayes administration 
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(1877-1881). For example, President Hayes, who was generally supportive of civil service reform, 
“flatly banned political activity by federal officeholders, as well as the practice of assessing them for 
political contributions in proportion to their salaries.” 117 The leaders of the civil service reform 
movement nonetheless complained that the Hayes administration’s reforms were too slow and lim-
ited, and they continued to organize and lobby for more sweeping legislation.118 Their efforts re-
ceived a considerable boost when a disappointed office-seeker, who thought he should have re-
ceived a patronage appointment for the work he had done for the Republican Party in the 1880 
election, shot and fatally wounded President Garfield in 1881.119 President Garfield, who in life had 
not been terribly sympathetic to the civil service reform movement, proved in death to be a useful 
rallying point. His assassination by a would-be beneficiary of the spoils system give reformers “a 
simple, emotion-packed illustration that the previously uninterested masses could understand: the 
spoils system murdered Garfield.”120 
 
The political momentum for civil service reform, stoked by anger over Garfield’s assassination, ulti-
mately led to the enactment of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act in January 1883, a little over 
17 years after Congressman Jenckes had introduced his first civil service reform bill.121 The Pend-
leton Act established a merit system, based on competitive examinations administered by a biparti-
san Civil Service Commission, for hiring certain classes of federal employees, and the Act prohib-
ited firing employees in those positions for political reasons.122 The scope of the merit system es-
tablished by the Pendleton Act was, however, weaker in substance and narrower in coverage that 
Congressman Jenckes’ original bill.123 The Pendleton Act applied only to certain classes of federal 
employees based either in Washington D.C. or in the post offices and customhouses in the largest 
cities—only about 10% of federal government jobs.124 Considerable political hostility to the Act 
persisted, even among politicians who had voted for the law and professed in public to support 
it.125 And the Pendleton Act did nothing directly to address patronage politics on the state and local 
levels. Although a couple of states—New York and Massachusetts—followed the federal govern-
ment’s example, enacting their own civil service reform bills in 1883 and 1884—“[c]ounterattacks 
… crippled reform enforcement in those states, and over twenty years elapsed from the passage of 
the Massachusetts law until the next states, Wisconsin and Illinois, enacted reform bills.”126 Indeed, 
at the state and local level, as discussed previously, the 1880s and 1890s saw the rapid expansion 
and entrenchment of urban political machines, which operated in an environment substantially un-
touched by federal civil service reform. 
 
So while the Pendleton Act was an important milestone, it was certainly not the end of the struggle 
for civil service reform. The Pendleton Act gave reformers “a foot in the door” and laid the 
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groundwork for future reform initiatives.127 Over the 1880s and 1890s, the merit system “made 
rapid strides in the federal bureaucracy,” with an ever-expanding set of federal government posi-
tions shifted into the merit system.128 (Part of this expansion may have been due to the continuing 
efforts of reformers, but much of it was the result of practical, arguably cynical, political calculation: 
Partisan control of the White House changed after every election between 1884 and 1896, and each 
new president followed the same pattern of first “appointing [his] partisans to unclassified offices, 
extended the merit system to freeze their appointments in place.”129) 
 
The period between the late 1880s and the turn of the century saw the emergence of several other 
important political reforms as well—reforms that, while not exclusively “anticorruption” reforms, 
were, like civil service reform, designed in substantial part to combat what was seen as the perni-
cious and corrupting influence of patronage-based political machines. First, this period saw the 
move to the secret ballot—an essential means of combating various forms of electoral corruption, 
including vote buying and coercion. In 1888 Massachusetts adopted the secret ballot, and by 1896 
this reform had spread to 39 states.130 Many states also began, albeit fitfully and rather ineffectively, 
to regulate political campaign expenditures, explicitly in the name of anticorruption. The pioneer 
here was New York, which in 1890 adopted a statute called the New York Corrupt Practices Act. 
This law, which was modeled on the British Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, sought to 
limit certain types of campaign expenditures and to require that candidates file campaign expense 
statements. Within the next few years, twenty other states had enacted similar laws.131 And, in an 
echo of one of the themes connected to the creation of independent railroad commissions in the 
1870s, a number of American cities in the late nineteenth century “shifted control of various mu-
nicipal functions into the hands of impartial boards,” partly as an attempt (not always successful) to 
put these functions beyond the corrupting influence of private firms and political machines.132 
 
Perhaps the period of greatest concentrated anticorruption reform in U.S. history was the first dec-
ade of the twentieth century, the dawn of the so-called Progressive Era.133 Several factors appear to 
have contributed to the acceleration of anticorruption and related reforms during this time. For one 
thing, while corruption might not have been as bad in the 1900s as it had been in, say, the 1870s, 
public awareness of—and outrage at—systemic corruption appears to have substantially increased 
by the turn of the century. Some of this change in public attitudes was likely due to changing social 
and economic conditions, but some of it was driven by the so-called “muckrakers”—journalists 
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who specialized in exposing the seamy underbelly of American politics, and in stoking popular de-
mand for reform.134 (Among the most famous examples of this genre are Lincoln Steffens’ maga-
zine articles on municipal corruption, written between 1901 and 1903 and later published together 
in the 1904 volume entitled The Shame of the Cities.135) For another thing, a new generation of lead-
ers—at the national, state, and local levels—made anticorruption central to their agendas and cam-
paigns.136 The extent to which these politicians were shaping public opinion, and the extent to 
which they were responding to changing public attitudes, is hard to say; it was likely a bit of both. 
Whatever the reason, fighting corruption became a central narrative in American political discourse 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. 
 
At the national level, President Theodore Roosevelt made fighting public corruption a defining fea-
ture of his presidency.137 Roosevelt, who became president in September 1901 after President 
McKinley’s assassination, sought to engage legislators and the public in his crusade. In his 1903 ad-
dress to Congress, President Roosevelt (in the specific context of discussing his administration’s ef-
forts to secure the extradition of corrupt U.S. politicians who had fled the country) declared: 
“There can be no crime more serious than bribery. Other offenses violate one law while corruption 
strikes at the foundation of all law. Under our form of Government all authority is vested in the 
people and by them delegated to those who represent them in official capacity. There can be no of-
fense heavier than that of him in whom such a sacred trust has been reposed, who sells it for his 
own gain and enrichment; and no less heavy is the offense of the bribe giver. He is worse than the 
thief, for the thief robs the individual, while the corrupt official plunders an entire city or State. He 
is as wicked as the murderer, for the murderer may only take one life against the law, while the cor-
rupt official and the man who corrupts the official alike aim at the assassination of the common-
wealth itself. Government of the people, by the people, for the people will perish from the face of 
the earth if bribery is tolerated. The givers and takers of bribes stand on an evil pre-eminence of in-
famy. The exposure and punishment of public corruption is an honor to a nation, not a disgrace. 
The shame lies in toleration, not in correction…. If we fail to do all that in us lies to stamp out cor-
ruption we can not escape our share of responsibility for the guilt. The first requisite of successful 
self-government is unflinching enforcement of the law and the cutting out of corruption.”138 
 
Progressive leaders on the state level, like Robert M. La Follette (governor of Wisconsin from 1901 
to 1906) and Charles Evans Hughes (governor of New York from 1907 to 1910), similarly made 
fighting corruption a central and explicit part of their reform agendas.139 
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The combination of leadership from above and pressure from below contributed to another wave 
of reforms, which crested roughly between 1904 and 1908 but continued well into the 1910s.140 At 
the risk of oversimplification, it seems that there were four main strands of Progressive Era anticor-
ruption reforms. 
 
The first of these was the further expansion of the civil service merit system at both the federal and 
state levels. As noted above, the merit system had continued to expand at the federal level over the 
1880s and 1890s, but the expansion accelerated under President Roosevelt. In the 18-plus years be-
tween January 1883, when the Pendleton Act was enacted, and September 1901, when President 
Roosevelt assumed office, the coverage of the federal merit system had expanded from about 10% 
of federal employees to about 46% of them. During President Roosevelt’s nearly eight years in of-
fice, the merit system expanded to cover roughly 66% of federal civil servants.141 Moreover, civil 
service reform at the state level, which had stalled for over two decades after New York and Massa-
chusetts adopted their laws in 1883 and 1884, picked up again in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, eventually leading to some sort of civil service reform in nearly every state.142 
 
Second, President Roosevelt’s administration ramped up federal criminal prosecutions of bribe-pay-
ers and bribe-takers. At the time President Roosevelt assumed office, although there were already 
reasonably strong federal anti-bribery laws on the books, those laws were not vigorously or consist-
ently enforced. But the Roosevelt Administration made corruption prosecutions a higher priority, 
beginning what one scholar has described as a “new era of criminal enforcement,” one in which 
prosecutors “indicted hundreds of people, and dozens were convicted.”143 Importantly, these anti-
corruption enforcement efforts resulted in the first-ever convictions of elected federal officials. In 
1905, Senator John Mitchell was convicted for his role in a land fraud scheme that involved hun-
dreds of other co-conspirators, and that same year Senator Joseph Burton was convicted for taking 
money to influence a post office decision.144 State-level criminal prosecutions for corrupt activity 
also started to increase at the beginning of the twentieth century, with numerous convictions of 
state and local officials.145 
 
Third, the nascent efforts to regulate political finance and lobbying—in order to stymie corrupt pri-
vate sector influence over legislative decisions—were deepened and extended in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, at both the federal and state levels. As noted above, in the 1880s and 1890s 
many states, led by New York, had enacted “corrupt practices” laws that regulated certain types of 
campaign expenditures, but these laws were relatively weak and did not cover the various ways that 
private interests might try to influence public officials through gifts, campaign donations, or lobby-
ing. In 1903, no state had any laws on these subjects. Just five years later, in 1908, a dozen states 
had passed laws regulating lobbying, 22 states limited corporate political contributions, and 24 
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states prohibited transportation companies from giving free passes to public officials (a common 
technique that railroad companies used to influence legislators).146 And in contrast to the late nine-
teenth century, there was important movement on the federal level as well: Public outrage over var-
ious scandals associated with corporate political contributions, which smacked of corruption, 
spurred President Roosevelt to push Congress for federal legislation addressing the problem. Con-
gress responded in 1907 by enacting the Tillman Act, which prohibited federally-chartered corpora-
tions from contributing to election campaigns, and prohibited all corporations, wherever chartered, 
from contributing to congressional and presidential campaigns.147 In 1910, during the Taft Admin-
istration, Congress went further, enacting a statute called the Federal Corrupt Practices Act that im-
posed disclosure requirements and campaign expenditure limits on political parties in House elec-
tions.148 Although the original version of this Act was both narrow and weak, it was amended in 
1911 to cover Senate elections and primary elections (though the latter provisions were invalidated 
by the Supreme Court in 1921).149 
 
Fourth, one of the signature institutional reforms of the Progressive Era was the creation (or, in 
some cases, the further strengthening) of independent regulatory commissions, which often wielded 
authority that had previously been in the hands of elected politicians.150 Recall that there had al-
ready been some early movement in this direction, most notably the Granger Laws of the 1870s, 
which established independent commissions to regulate railroad rates. This type of institutional re-
form expanded and accelerated during the Progressive Era. While progressives advanced many ar-
guments to justify the creation of independent regulatory boards, in many states these boards were 
a conscious and explicit response to the perceived corrupt influence that powerful industries exer-
cised over politicians and political parties.151 As one historian summed up the view of many Pro-
gressive Era reformers, “Regulation by commissions seemed to be an effective way to halt corrup-
tion by transferring the responsibility for business-government relations from party bosses and leg-
islators to impartial experts.”152 As was true in the 1870s, when it came to corruption of legislatures, 
railroad companies were viewed as among the worst culprits, especially in southern and western 
states;153 between 1905 and 1907, fifteen states established new railroad commissions, and other 
states strengthened their existing commissions.154 But the scope of the authority that states assigned 
to independent regulatory commissions expanded as well, covering not just railroads and other 
transportation companies but also public utilities like gas, electricity, and telecommunications.155 
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Between 1903 and 1908, 41 states either established new independent commissions, or strength-
ened their existing commissions, to regulate transportation and utility companies.156 At the federal 
level too, the expansion of federal regulatory authority into areas like food safety was accompanied 
by the creation of independent commissions to exercise that authority. Over the course of the first 
two decades of the twentieth century, not only economic regulation but also “other governmental 
policy areas, including health, education, taxation, correction, and the control of natural resources, 
increasingly came under the jurisdiction of independent boards and commissions.”157 
 
None of these four strands of anticorruption reform was wholly new; each built on the foundation 
laid by earlier generations.158 Nevertheless, the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, 
from roughly the beginning of President Roosevelt’s administration up through the U.S. entry into 
World War I in 1917 during the Wilson Administration, were a significant period for the advance of 
the fight against corruption in the United States. As two scholars summed up the accomplishments 
of the Progressive Era reformers, “By the early twentieth century, the full apparatus of modern 
checks on corruption was in place. Rules had generally replaced discretion in many areas, such as 
patronage. Different levels of government more effectively patrolled each other. Greater competi-
tion and political independence in the news media meant that corrupt activities and charges were 
more likely to be reported everywhere in America, not just in the big cities. Finally, voter expecta-
tions about corrupt behavior had changed, and revealed corruption was more likely to lead to polit-
ical defeat.”159 
 
That doesn’t mean that everything was smooth sailing after that. The 1920s, which saw the rise of 
more conservative political forces—especially at the national level, with the presidencies of Warren 
G. Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929), and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933)—saw little 
forward movement, and some retrenchment, on the Progressive Era’s institutional reform agenda. 
And in many respects, the post-World War I period was a time of backsliding with respect to cor-
ruption, with the Harding administration in particular “wallow[ing] in a succession of scandals remi-
niscent of the Grant era.”160 The most infamous of these scandals was the so-called Teapot Dome 
affair of 1922, in which Interior Secretary Albert Fall took bribes from oil company executives to 
arrange for leases that gave those companies drilling rights in the U.S. Navy’s oil reserves in Teapot 
Dome, Wyoming and Elk Hill, California.161 This misconduct was not uncovered until a Senate 
committee investigation in 1924, after Fall had left the cabinet.162 
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Yet while the Teapot Dome scandal demonstrated that grand corruption at the highest levels of the 
government had not yet been eliminated, the response to the scandal suggested progress in how the 
U.S. government dealt with such allegations. Recall that in the nineteenth century, federal corrup-
tion prosecutions were relatively rare, and prosecutions of high-level federal officials like cabinet 
secretaries were unheard of. By the 1920s, things had changed. The Senate committee’s 1924 report 
on the Teapot Dome scandal prompted President Coolidge (who had assumed office in 1923 after 
President Harding’s death) to appoint two special counsels (one Democrat and one Republican) to 
jointly investigate and prosecute those responsible. Although the prosecution of Fall did not go en-
tirely smoothly, in 1929 he was convicted of bribery, fined, and imprisoned.163 The two oil compa-
nies involved were also forced to pay back over $47 million to the U.S. government.164 
 
Fall’s conviction was significant in that it demonstrated that cabinet officials were not immune to 
criminal prosecution for corruption, and the case against him was a sign of a “new seriousness 
about the criminal aspect of the bribe.”165 And the Teapot Dome affair was not the only corruption 
scandal that resulted in the criminal punishment of high-level federal officials. For example, in 1924 
the Director of the Veterans’ Bureau, Charles Forbes, was convicted for his role in a procurement 
bribery scheme,166 and in 1926 a senior U.S. Representative from Kentucky, John Wesley Langley, 
was convicted for taking bribes to use his influence in obtaining permits for whiskey shipments into 
Kentucky.167 Moreover, while much of the reformist spirit of the Progressive Era had dissipated by 
the 1920s, there were some additional legal reforms during this period that addressed corruption 
concerns. Most notably, in 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which 
strengthened and expanded on the Tillman Act by requiring disclosure of campaign contributions 
and campaign expenditures, and imposing some campaign spending limits.168 So, even during the 
more politically conservative 1920s, there was some progress in the fight against corruption. 
 
The next major set of important reforms, which contributed to the further suppression of systemic 
corruption in U.S. government, took place during the administration of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.  Under President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the country experienced a substantial expan-
sion of federal regulation and federal social welfare programs. In contrast to the Progressive Era, 
where anticorruption was central to the political discourse and the reform agenda,169 the New Deal 
period did not involve the same sort of explicit attention to corruption as such. This is understand-
able: The highest priority for the Roosevelt Administration, and for most American citizens, was 
addressing the massive economic and social crisis caused by the Great Depression. Nevertheless, 
the New Deal period was a time of several important developments in the fight against government 
corruption. 
 
                                                     
163 NOONAN, supra note 24, at 566; Burrows, supra note 44, at 436. 
164 NOONAN, supra note 24, at 566; Burrows, supra note 44, at 436. 
165 NOONAN, supra note 24, at 565. 
166 Burrows, supra note 44, at 436. 
167 NOONAN, supra note 24, at 602. 
168 Burrows, supra note 44, at 436. 
169 Glaeser & Goldin, supra note 32, at 4. 
  28 
First, policymakers approved a further expansion of the civil service merit system, together with 
new measures to increase the professionalism and integrity of the civil service. These developments 
did not take place immediately. Indeed, the early years of the Roosevelt Administration were 
marked by the creation of a number of new agencies with staffs appointed outside of the merit sys-
tem. While one could argue that this was the right approach under the circumstances, by 1937 it 
had become clear that bureaucratic reforms were sorely needed, and President Roosevelt appointed 
a Committee on Administrative Management (known as the Brownlow Committee, after its chair 
Louis Brownlow) to recommend reforms to the federal bureaucracy.170  The Brownlow Committee 
proposed, among other things, that the merit system should be expanded to cover all federal civil 
service positions except for those with substantial policy-making responsibilities. President Roose-
velt acted on that recommendation, and by the time the U.S. entered World War II in December 
1941, the merit system covered approximately 90% of the federal civil service.171 The other major 
New Deal-era development with respect to the civil service involved greater restrictions on political 
activities by government employees. In 1939, Congress enacted the Hatch Act, which barred all but 
the most senior federal employees from engaging in partisan political activities, such as taking part 
in political campaigns or soliciting campaign contributions. A year later, in 1940, Congress amended 
the Hatch Act to extend its prohibitions to state and local officials paid (in whole or in part) with 
federal funds.172 
 
Second, the Roosevelt administration ratcheted up efforts to detect and punish corruption, though 
both criminal law enforcement and administrative oversight. Some of this was a further extension 
of the more aggressive approach to anticorruption prosecutions that had started during the Pro-
gressive Era and continued through the 1920s.173 But there were important new developments as 
well. In particular, the Roosevelt Administration made fighting corruption in the administration of 
federal welfare programs a high priority. Prior to 1932, social welfare programs were generally run 
by local governments, and were rife with corruption and patronage.174 President Roosevelt, how-
ever, recognized that the credibility of the New Deal would be undermined if voters came to see 
New Deal welfare programs as corrupt.175 The Roosevelt Administration therefore took aggressive 
measures to prevent corruption in these programs—promulgating new rules, establishing special 
administrative offices to investigate complaints about corruption in government programs, creating 
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a more centralized investigative division to address concerns about maladministration, and vigor-
ously prosecuting offenders.176 These measures appear to have been effective: Despite the long his-
tory of extensive corruption in American social welfare programs prior to the New Deal, and de-
spite the fact that huge new federal initiatives like the 1933 federal unemployment relief program 
“offered an opportunity for corruption unique in the nation’s history,” the Roosevelt Administra-
tion’s welfare programs, though often attacked by opponents as overly bureaucratic or politicized, 
seem to have been administered with a high degree of integrity.177 Both allegations of corruption 
and evidence of actual corruption were rare, and diminished over the course of the New Deal.178 
 
The expansion of social welfare programs during the New Deal also appears to have contributed to 
the reduction in corruption through another, less direct channel as well. Recall that much of the 
corruption in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly at the local level, was as-
sociated with political machines. Those machines sought to control, and often stole, public re-
sources, creating additional costs for and undermining the integrity of local government opera-
tions.179  But the machines also provided a measure of economic security for their rank-and-file 
supporters. In a world “without Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, workmen’s 
compensation, or welfare,” pledging to support the party machine “in exchange for services—help 
with the law, finding a job, getting a new apartment after a fire, access to coal during hard times”—
was a rational choice for many working class people.180 The expansion of the government safety net 
administered by federal and state agencies during the New Deal diminished the importance of the 
political machines in providing low-income citizens with safety and security, and thereby contrib-
uted to the weakening of the political machines.181 More generally, as another historian of the pe-
riod has suggested, because “endemic corruption often emerged in sectors where the government 
did not … regulat[e] sectors that would benefit from regulation,” the expansion of federal regula-
tion during the New Deal period may have undermined the functional foundations of at least some 
forms of corruption.182 
 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to assert with confidence which reforms, or combination of re-
forms, were most important, though in the next section, we will hazard a few speculations along 
these lines. But putting that issue to the side for the moment, it appears that in the period between 
the end of the American Civil War in 1865 and the U.S. entry into World War II in 1941, the 
United States made substantial progress in taming systemic corruption. As we have seen, corrup-
tion in the 1850s was pervasive and deeply rooted; systemic corruption persisted, though the form 
had evolved a bit, in the 1870s. But by the 1930s, and certainly by the 1940s and 1950s, corruption, 
though still an important problem, appeared more as a deviation from norms of acceptable political 
behavior than as a routine feature of American governance. 
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Though it is difficult to quantify the difference, one piece of evidence for a significant change can 
be found in domestic newspaper coverage: The fraction of total news stories about politics and 
government that discuss corruption declined substantially from the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s, 
remained stable for a couple of decades (a time when, it should be noted, increased coverage of 
corruption by muckrakers and others may have offset declines in actual corruption), and then sub-
stantially declined again over the 1930s.183 That quantitative evidence, though problematic in several 
respects, accords with the judgment of professional scholars who have studied the topic. As one 
leading historian of U.S. corruption put it, over the 40-50 years following the Teapot Dome scandal 
of the mid-1920s, “the chronic, systematic venality of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries virtually disappeared from view.”184 To be sure, there were occasional corruption incidents and 
scandals in the federal government in the decades following the end of World War II, but “even 
taken as a whole, these … incidents do not suggest either widespread or systematic venality.”185 In-
deed, given the substantial growth of the federal government over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury, the relative rarity of major high-level executive branch corruption scandals “tend[s] to confirm 
the increasingly adventitious and marginal nature of corruption in the executive branch since the 
1920’s.”186 The story is a bit more complicated and uneven with respect to Congress, but here too it 
appears that in the post-World War II era, corruption had become aberrational rather than sys-
temic, and that, especially when one takes into account “the awesome increases in the size and 
scope of government, … all of the cases of congressional venality together may still represent a rel-
ative decline in the frequency and severity of corruption[.]”187 The waning influence of patronage 
machines in large cities provides further evidence of a meaningful change. These urban political 
machines took off in the 1870s and 1880s and peaked around the turn of the twentieth century, 
when about these machines dominated politics in roughly 70% of U.S. cities. But the number and 
power of the machines weakened thereafter, and while some limped along for decades, they were 
mostly gone by 1975.188 
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The story did not end after the New Deal, of course. The fight against corruption continued well 
into the twentieth century. The 1970s, for example, saw not only the various legal reforms enacted 
in the wake of the Watergate scandal (such as the Ethics in Government Act, the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), but also the emergence of aggressive federal 
prosecution of state and local corruption,189 as well as the so-called “Abscam” operation, in which 
federal prosecutors caught several members of Congress in an anti-bribery sting operation.190 In-
deed, the struggle against corruption in the United States continues to this day, and will probably 
never end. Yet we would tentatively identify the period between 1865 and 1941 as the time when 
the United States underwent the most significant transition, from a country where corruption, 
though deeply unpopular with much of the public, is an entrenched part of the political operating 
system, to a country where corruption, while still a serious problem, is aberrational and largely man-
ageable. This naturally invites the question of what, if anything, reformers in modern developing 
and transitional countries struggling with entrenched corruption might learn from U.S. history. We 
cannot provide a full answer to that question, but in the next section we offer some tentative 
thoughts on how the U.S. historical experience might inform current debates on fighting systemic 
corruption in the twenty-first century. 
 
III. Implications of the U.S. Historical Experience for Current Debates Over Anticorrup-
tion Strategy 
 
What lessons, if any, does this brief sketch of the history of U.S. anticorruption efforts in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century hold for modern countries struggling with entrenched cor-
ruption? At the outset, it is worth emphasizing again the hazards of extracting straightforward con-
clusions about “what works” from a single case, especially given the substantial differences in so-
cial, economic, and political context, as well as the inherent complexities and uncertainties involved 
in trying to account even for one country’s experience. We do think that even our cursory survey of 
U.S. history is suggestive of some elements of a successful campaign to root out systemic corrup-
tion, and we hope that future work in this vein will be able to extract from this and other historical 
cases some useful affirmative guidance for modern anticorruption reformers. For now, though, we 
shy away from that more ambitious goal, and instead focus on how the U.S. historical experience 
may call into question, or at least complicate, certain hypotheses and rhetorical tropes that feature 
prominently in the contemporary discourse regarding systemic corruption in the modern develop-
ing world. 
 
We focus on four such claims. The first, which we have already discussed, is the claim that systemic 
corruption is so deeply rooted in national culture or character that it is as impervious to conscious 
human intervention as geography. This is admittedly not a claim that one sees advanced explicitly in 
scholarly articles, but those who work in the anticorruption field will likely find it familiar. The 
trope, perhaps surprisingly, seems most common among people from the very countries where 
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such corruption is widespread; one often hears such people—perhaps in frustration or resigna-
tion—express the view that corruption in their country is so deeply ingrained that there’s no hope. 
As we have already emphasized, though, the United States—as well as other countries like Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom—call that fatalistic view into question, simply by vir-
tue of having succeeded in making a transition from systemic corruption to aberrational corruption, 
notwithstanding a starting point that looked not so different from that of modern-day developing 
countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, or Ukraine. 
 
In this final section, we turn to three other claims that appear in the contemporary anticorruption 
discourse, all of which are at least complicated by the U.S. experience. The first is the claim that 
successfully dislodging endemic corruption requires a disruptive “big bang.” The second is the 
claim that the key to reducing systemic corruption is reducing the size and scope of government. 
And the third is the claim that criminal law enforcement and other “direct” approaches that empha-
size individual accountability are typically ineffective, and possibly even irrelevant or counterpro-
ductive, in the fight against systemic corruption. We will consider each in turn. 
 
A. Does Fighting Entrenched Corruption Require a “Big Bang”? 
 
According to some scholars, the main reason that endemic corruption has proven stubbornly per-
sistent is corruption’s self-reinforcing property: The more people in a society or institution who en-
gage in corruption, the stronger the incentives every person in that community has to behave cor-
ruptly. After all, when corruption is widespread, the risks of engaging in corruption are lower, 
moral or social inhibitions weaken, and corrupt conduct is easier to rationalize. Moreover, when 
corruption is widespread, the institutions that might combat corruption are more likely to be them-
selves corrupted. Thus a vicious circle arises, where corruption begets more corruption. And even if 
most people—including those who currently participate in the corrupt system—would actually pre-
fer to live in a society without corruption, no one person would find it rational to abstain from cor-
ruption if most others continued to behave corruptly. The corruption problem, according to this 
view, is a type of “collective action problem.”191 Furthermore, some proponents of this view con-
tinue, the only way for reformers to tackle this problem is through a “big bang” approach: pushing 
through a set of comprehensive, coordinated, and aggressive reforms, implemented over a relatively 
short time.192 The idea is that if the corruption problem is indeed a collective action problem, only a 
dramatic shock will reset expectations and overcome corruption’s powerfully self-reinforcing 
tendencies. A variant on the argument emphasizes that, because corrupt actors will mobilize once 
they realize their power is threatened, the window of opportunity for genuine anticorruption re-
form tends to be narrow and to close quickly; therefore, the argument continues, reformers must 
take rapid and decisive action when those windows of opportunity appear, because if they do not 
expunge systemic corruption during those rare moments of opportunity, the system will revert to 
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its corrupt status quo ante.193 The stronger version of the pro-“big bang” position not only main-
tains the superiority of this approach, but also assets that partial or incremental reforms are point-
less and doomed to failure.194 
 
We accept the idea that under some circumstances, a big bang approach might be necessary, or at 
least preferable. Certainly there’s a good case for seizing moments of political opportunity before 
they slip away. But the strong claim that a transition away from systemic corruption requires a big 
bang approach is not only theoretically problematic—a point one of us has developed in prior 
work195—but is also hard to square with the U.S. historical experience recounted in this essay. (The 
claim is also in considerable tension with the historical experience of other Western countries, 
though that is not our main focus here.196) Although there were certainly bursts of intense anticor-
ruption activity over the course of the 76 years between 1865 and 1941, it would be a real stretch to 
characterize anticorruption reform over this period as a “big bang.” The reform process would be 
more accurately characterized as incremental, uneven, and spread out over at least three genera-
tions. 
 
Consider, as one notable example, civil service reform. The transition to a merit-based system for 
hiring, retaining, and promoting civil servants is considered was one of the most important institu-
tional changes in the suppression of systemic corruption and patronage—not only in the United 
States, but in other countries as well.197 The creation and implementation of such a system in the 
United States was a lengthy, drawn-out process, not something that was achieved in just a few years 
in a burst of rapid structural reform. For starters, it took 17 years from Congressman Jenckes’ in-
troduction of his first civil service reform bill in December 1865 until the Pendleton Act was finally 
passed in January 1883, with lots of struggle and incremental progress in the interim. Moreover, the 
Pendleton Act, though an important first step, only covered about 10% of the federal civil service. 
It was not until 1941 that the merit system finally covered roughly 90% of federal civil employees. 
So, the time it took to get from the first serious proposal for federal civil service reform to a merit 
system that actually covered all but the most senior policymaking officials was roughly three-quar-
ters of a century, and the path from beginning to end was anything but smooth.198 
 
Enforcement of laws against corruption also increased gradually, in fits and starts, rather than oc-
curring in one dramatic, concentrated crackdown. Criminal laws against corruption expanded incre-
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mentally. In the earliest days of the Republic, Congress enacted a handful of relatively narrow fed-
eral statutes criminalizing certain corrupt acts;199 other forms of corruption, even where not explic-
itly covered by statute, might also have been considered criminal at the time.200 But these laws were 
only rarely and sporadically enforced.201 The situation was similar in the states, where “a patchwork 
of statutory and common laws covered a small set of potentially corrupting activities,” but even 
these laws were “rarely used.”202 The legal regime gradually strengthened over time, at both the fed-
eral and state levels—but did so in bits and pieces, rather than in one fell swoop.203 And meaningful 
enforcement lagged behind legal reform, often by multiple generations.204 But, as Part II of this es-
say illustrated, enforcement—both criminal and non-criminal—did gradually ratchet up. The expo-
sure of the Credit Mobilier scandal in 1872 might not have resulted in criminal prosecutions, but it 
did lead to the expulsion of two members of Congress.205 And the Whiskey Ring scandal a few 
years later produced a large number of criminal prosecutions and convictions—though well-con-
nected high-level figures were protected.206 In 1877 President Hayes ordered investigations into 
corruption in customs offices, and these investigations also led to terminations and in some cases 
prosecutions of corrupt officials.207 These early signs of a willingness to take action against corrupt 
officials may have stalled in the 1880s and 1890s, but picked up in the Progressive Era208—though 
even then, despite the aggressive posture adopted by President Roosevelt and a number of state 
governors, enforcement was uneven, with some powerful figures in both the public and private sec-
tor escaping accountability.209 Still, the first decade of the twentieth century finally saw criminal 
convictions of U.S. Senators, indicating cracks, albeit limited ones, in the de facto impunity of the 
most senior officials had long enjoyed.210  Those cracks widened in the 1920s with the Teapot 
Dome prosecutions, which took down a former cabinet secretary,211 which were followed by other 
successful prosecutions of Members of Congress and senior executive branch officials.212 During 
the New Deal period and beyond, investigations and prosecutions of corrupt conduct had become 
more common, though as noted above, some of the most important federal crackdowns on state 
and local corruption did not occur until the 1970s. Here again, the story is not so much one of a 
major crackdown that dislodged corruption from the system, but rather a story of long-term une-
ven progress, with a weak and under-enforced legal regime gradually strengthened over time, and 
the de facto immunity of the most senior government officials gradually eroded. 
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These and other examples illustrate why “incremental, uneven, and slow” would be a better charac-
terization of the U.S. transition away from systemic corruption than would the “big bang” moniker. 
Admittedly, it’s possible to characterize certain more compressed periods as anticorruption “big 
bangs” of a sort. The best candidate for such a label would probably be the first decade of the 
twentieth century, when Progressive Era leaders at the national, state, and local levels ramped up 
enforcement of anticorruption laws and pushed through a variety of important institutional re-
forms. Yet without diminishing the importance of the Progressive Era changes, it’s important to 
recognize, as Part II of this essay emphasizes, that the Progressive Era reforms both built on the 
foundation laid by previous generations of reformers (for example, with respect to things like the 
civil service merit system and the use of independent regulatory commissions) and did not fully suc-
ceed in effecting the transition from systemic corruption to aberrational corruption—a transition 
that was achieved by subsequent generations that built on Progressive Era foundations. 
 
In sum, the story of U.S. anticorruption reform seems to be less a story of an enlightened, far-
sighted leader pushing through a dramatic, comprehensive, and disruptive reform agenda, and more 
that of a long slow slog, with moments of significant progress mixed in with periods of setback or 
stagnation, but ultimately with a sufficient accumulation of meaningful changes to effect a substan-
tial transformation of the norms and institutions of American governance. And indeed, this is how 
most historians have characterized the transition. As one scholar, focusing principally on the fight 
against the corruption of the urban political machines, has explained, “[R]eform was a slow busi-
ness. Nearly half a century was required after urban corruption began to rise in the 1850s before 
reform matured from the simple idea of ‘cut the budget and throw the rascals out’ to a set of poli-
cies designed to rebuild city government into a structure that would be both resistant to corruption 
and able to meet the rising demands on urban government.”213 Furthermore, in contrast to many of 
the more popular modern anticorruption success stories—like Singapore and Hong Kong and 
Georgia—which emphasize the initiative and decisive action of a particular chief executive (Lee 
Kwan Yew, Murray MacLehose, and Mikheil Saakashvili, respectively), in the United States, good 
governance and anticorruption reform “has seldom been credited to a particular political leader. 
Although there have been exceptions, as in the cases of the two Roosevelts and Woodrow Wilson, 
even their efforts are best seen as culminations of lengthy reform movements.”214 
 
B. Is Reducing the Size of Government the Key to Reducing Corruption? 
 
In addition to (or sometimes in conjunction with) the argument that dislodging systemic corruption 
requires a comprehensive “big bang,” one often encounters the argument that the best way, or per-
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haps the only way, to prevent such corruption is to drastically reduce the size and scope of the gov-
ernment. As the Nobel Laureate economist Gary Becker once succinctly put it, “if you want to cut 
corruption, cut government.”215 
 
How well does this hypothesis fit the U.S. historical experience? If one focuses on the nineteenth 
century, one could find plenty of evidence to support the “big government, big corruption hypoth-
esis.” The nineteenth century was a time not only of rapid economic growth, but also of rapid 
growth in the size and importance of government. Governments at all levels (federal, state, and lo-
cal) provided “lucrative charters, franchises, licenses, and contracts,” as well as “the laws of prop-
erty and exchange.”216 This expansion in the size and importance of government over the course of 
the nineteenth century created new opportunities, and much stronger incentives for, various forms 
of public corruption.217 The surge in corruption during the post-Civil War period in particular has 
been attributed in part to the “expansion of the national government.”218 Many of those living 
through the upheavals of the nineteenth century agreed not only with this diagnosis—that the ex-
pansion of the size and scope of government was a contributing factor to the surge in corruption—
but also endorsed a version of Professor Becker’s prescription. Andrew Jackson was one notable 
early adopter of the view that shrinking government was essential to containing corruption. In Pres-
ident Jackson’s view, the remedy to the threat posed by a corrupt alliance between public institu-
tions and moneyed interests “was to scale down governmental undertakings, on the grounds that 
public privileges [lead] to both corruption and inequality.”219 Decades later, in the fallout of the 
Credit Mobilier scandal of the 1870s, several contemporary commentators drew a similar conclu-
sion, arguing that the grand corruption exemplified by the Credit Mobilier affair demonstrated why 
the government needed to get out of the infrastructure business altogether, leaving the develop-
ments of railroads, telegraphs, roads, and canals to private industry, without subsidies or protec-
tions.220 
 
So, as of roughly 1875, U.S. history would seem to provide ample evidence in support of the hy-
pothesis that expansions in the size and power of government was associated with increases in cor-
ruption, and one might naturally conclude that the only way to get systemic corruption under con-
trol would be to scale back the scope of government activities. Not so, however, with the next 75-
plus years of U.S. history. If anything, this period featured even greater increases in the size and 
power of government—especially though not exclusively the federal government—yet it is also the 
period when the U.S. achieved the greatest successes in getting systemic corruption under control. 
It may well be true that the dramatic increase in the role of government in the economy was a sig-
nificant contributor to the expansion and entrenchment of systemic corruption between the Era of 
Good Feelings and the Gilded Age. But the ultimately successful effort to tame this corruption 
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over the next three-quarters of a century—the period stretching from the 1880s through the Pro-
gressive Era and up to the New Deal and beyond—did not entail any shrinking of the state. Quite 
the opposite—the pace of government expansion only accelerated during the first half of the twen-
tieth century.221 As two economic historians sum up the seeming paradox, on the one hand it seems 
that the surge in corruption over the course of the nineteenth century was driven in part by the ex-
pansion in the size and role of government, which increased the potential economic returns to cor-
rupting government officials, but on the other hand, “the decline in corruption between the mid-
1870s and 1920 was not associated with declining returns to corruption[, given that the] size of the 
government continued to rise[.]”222 
 
What explains this? If the expansion of government from the 1820s and the 1870s fueled the 
growth in systemic corruption, why was the further, and even more dramatic, expansion of govern-
ment from the 1880s through the mid-twentieth century associated with a steady reduction in cor-
ruption? There are a number of possible explanations. First, the problem in the nineteenth century 
may not have been the growth of government as such, but rather the growth of government with-
out adequate institutional safeguards and oversight. When public officials had, by virtue of their 
largely unchecked discretion, the ability to influence the allocation of substantial amounts of wealth, 
it is unsurprising that many of them adopted the attitude so memorably captured by Tammany Hall 
operative George Washington Plunkitt: “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em.”223 But during the 
period from the mid-1870s through the New Deal, those opportunities were constricted—not by 
shrinking the government, but by making it harder for government agents to use their power for 
personal or partisan advantage. Civil service reform simultaneously made it harder to reward loyal-
ists with plum jobs, and shifted control over government decision-making from party hacks to 
competent professionals. The creation of semi-autonomous regulatory commissions reduced op-
portunities for elected officials to leverage their power to sell favorable regulatory treatment. 
Greater financial transparency made it harder to misappropriate public funds.224 And the strength-
ening and stepped-up enforcement not only of criminal laws and administrative controls, but grow-
ing bureaucratic capacity to enforce laws, increased the risks and consequences of getting caught.225 
Even while the continued growth in the size and power of government increased the potential ben-
efits of engaging in corrupt activities, then, the potential costs increased even more sharply, thus 
leading to a substantial net reduction.226 
 
Three additional considerations are worth mentioning here. First, efforts to improve government 
integrity may have been, at least in part, a consequence of the expansion of government power. The 
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more government affected lives and livelihoods, and the more it was apparent that corruption in 
government programs posed a threat to same, the more public pressure there was to take measures 
to promote public integrity. Relatedly, the expansion in the size of the government bureaucracy 
may have contributed to the increase in support for civil service reform by high-level politicians, as 
the larger bureaucracy was harder for them to control through direct intervention or patronage.227 
The story is obviously more complicated than that simple framing suggests. The expansion of pub-
lic involvement in economic development in the early nineteenth century, as we have seen, was as-
sociated in an explosion of public corruption, and if that explosion eventually produced a move-
ment for greater government integrity, it did so only with a considerable lag. Yet there does seem to 
be some association between periods of significant expansion of government power—during the 
Civil War and the New Deal, for example—and public pressure for pro-integrity reforms. 
 
Second, and perhaps as an additional explanation for why the expansion of government was associ-
ated with an increase in systemic corruption in the pre-Civil War period but with reductions in sys-
temic corruption later on, it seems that the nature of government activity shifted, at least in empha-
sis, from more particularistic interventions by elected politicians (conveying land, chartering corpo-
rations, subsidizing specific infrastructure projects) to more programmatic interventions, most ob-
viously the large social welfare programs of the New Deal. That shift, as we have seen, was at least 
in part a consequence of concerns about corruption, though other factors—including perhaps the 
increasing scale and centralization of government activity—contributed as well. Whatever the rea-
sons, the U.S. experience is at least suggestive of the possibility that the magnitude of government 
intervention in the economy may be less important, from an anticorruption perspective, than the 
form that intervention takes. 
 
Third, we should consider another important reason why the expansion of the size and scope of 
government during the first half of the twentieth century may have been associated with a decrease, 
rather than an increase, in systemic corruption. Not only did institutional reforms and more aggres-
sive oversight reduce the amount of corruption in those government programs, but many of these 
programs may have ameliorated some of the underlying problems that contributed to the power of 
corrupt political machines. As noted earlier, while the machines may not have been good for the 
overall economic or political health of the community overall, they provided their supporters with 
valuable benefits and support.228 As the government took on an increasing role in providing wel-
fare, social insurance, and other public goods, the political machines lost some of their value to 
their rank-and-file supporters, making them easier to marginalize and eventually displace.229 In 
other words, the growth in government during the early twentieth century may have correlated with 
declining systemic corruption in part because much of this growth was due to an expanding gov-
ernment-provided social safety net, which supplanted some of the functions of the corrupt political 
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machines, and more generally reduced the poverty and inequality that are thought by many re-
searchers to be significant contributors to corruption.230 
 
In sum, Becker’s assertion that the key to “root[ing] out corruption” is “boot[ing] out big govern-
ment”231 does not seem consistent with the U.S. historical experience. We would not be so bold as 
to argue that the U.S. experience affirmatively demonstrates the validity of some other hypothesis, 
such as the claim that bigger governments generally reduce corruption— though that claim does 
seem more consistent with the modern cross-country evidence than Becker’s hypothesis.232 Our 
more modest conclusion here is that, as with the hypothesis that rooting out systemic corruption 
requires a disruptive “big bang” approach, the U.S. experience, though admittedly only a single data 
point, casts doubt on the hypothesis and suggests the need for more careful, nuanced considera-
tion. 
 
C. Enforcing Rules or Changing Systems (or Both)? 
 
There are, broadly and crudely speaking, two main methods that reformers advance for taming cor-
ruption. First, there are “direct” measures that focus on detecting and sanctioning individual cor-
rupt actors, both to prevent them from engaging in future corruption and to deter others who 
might be tempted to engage in similar malfeasance. Enactment and enforcement of criminal laws 
against bribery, embezzlement, and other corrupt acts are the most obvious example of this punish-
ment-based strategy in action, but there are other mechanisms for detecting and disciplining cor-
rupt actors that would also fit into this general category. (For example, legislatures and bureaucratic 
agencies may have codes of conduct, violations of which are not necessarily crimes, and which are 
enforced by internal bodies rather than courts.) The second broad approach to fighting systemic 
corruption is through “indirect” measures—institutional or social reforms that reduce the incentive 
or opportunity to engage in corruption, but that do not specifically target corrupt individuals, and 
might not be framed or understood as about fighting corruption as such.233 The proposal to fight 
corruption by reducing the size of government, discussed above, would fall into this category. So 
would things like civil service reform, privatization of government services, expansion of public ed-
ucation, and so forth. 
 
Most anticorruption reformers, as well as most scholars who study the topic, would likely agree that 
both individual accountability and preventative structural measures are important ingredients in the 
fight against corruption. That said, critics sometimes argue that certain governments focus exces-
sively on detection and punishment of individuals, at the expense of structural reforms, and that in 
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situations of systemic corruption, trying to ameliorate the problem solely through punishment-ori-
ented “crackdowns” is doomed to failure. 
 
The U.S. historical experience certainly seems to corroborate the claim that structural reforms are 
crucial to successfully taming endemic corruption. During the three-quarter-century period we sur-
veyed above, many of the most crucial reforms—reforms that seem closely associated with the de-
cline in systemic corruption during the twentieth century, though we admittedly cannot prove 
this—were broad institutional reforms that reduced the incentives and opportunities for corrup-
tion, rather than crackdowns that emphasized detection and punishment of individual corrupt ac-
tors. Civil service reform is the most prominent illustration, but there are others, including the ex-
panded use of independent regulatory commissions, stricter campaign finance disclosure rules, the 
abolition of the moiety system in customs, and several others. 
 
That said, it has recently become fashionable, in some quarters of the anticorruption community, to 
suggest that “direct” strategies that emphasize individual accountability—through the criminal law 
or other mechanisms—as mostly an irrelevant distraction in countries that are beset by systemic 
corruption. While not entirely dismissing the importance of vigorously enforced anticorruption 
laws in countries that have less pervasive corruption, proponents of this argument sometimes sug-
gest that when corruption is so deeply enmeshed in the political system that corrupt deals are just 
“the way things get done,” seeking to punish individual corrupt actors (even a lot of them) is not 
just insufficient—a point that most experts would endorse—but actually an unhelpful distraction, 
and might actually prove counterproductive. On this view, when corruption is thoroughly and 
deeply embedded, the focus should be exclusively (or at least overwhelmingly) on preventative 
measures that address the root causes of corruption, rather than on efforts to hold individual cor-
rupt actors personally accountable.234 
 
The U.S. historical experience, however, seems inconsistent with this view. While structural, pre-
ventative reforms—things like civil service reform and depoliticization of regulatory decisions—
played an important role in long-term progress, the evidence suggests (though again does not 
prove) that measures to hold individual corrupt actors accountable also played a significant role. As 
noted earlier, the efforts to hold corrupt actors accountable proceeded in fits and starts, but these 
efforts nonetheless appeared important, particularly after the turn of the twentieth century. Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt and other Progressive Era reformers promoted vigorous enforcement of 
existing laws against corruption. Such enforcement was associated with a period of declining cor-
ruption, at least so far as we can tell from the admittedly imperfect evidence. And prosecutions, es-
pecially of high-level officials, likely served an important symbolic function, even when such prose-
cutions were still relatively rare. Consider the prosecution and conviction of former Interior Secre-
tary Albert Fall for his role in the Teapot Dome scandal. As Judge John Noonan writes in his his-
tory of bribery, this conviction “changed the prevailing rule [that a sufficiently senior government 
official was de facto immune from prosecution for bribery] or, rather, demonstrated that [this rule] 
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was not of iron.”235 This case, together with the conviction roughly a decade later of a federal judge, 
Martin Manton, for participating in a bribery scheme, were, as Judge Noonan concludes, perceived 
as “signs of a new seriousness about the criminal aspect of the bribe,” notwithstanding the fact that 
these cases remained unusual for the time.236 And outside the context of criminal prosecutions and 
punishment, a number of important government initiatives sought to detect, punish, and deter cor-
rupt actors in other ways. Consider, by way of illustration, the substantial efforts that President 
Franklin Roosevelt undertook to combat corruption in New Deal relief programs. 
 
It is also perhaps relevant here that, notwithstanding the fact that in some contexts it may be more 
effective to push for good government reforms without explicitly referencing corruption—so as to 
make such reforms seem less threatening—it seems that many U.S. reformers often took the oppo-
site tack. As we have seen, the proponents of civil service reform in the late nineteenth century, and 
the Progressives at the beginning of the twentieth century, deliberately packaged their general insti-
tutional reforms explicitly as anticorruption measures, even when it would have been possible to 
justify those reforms on other grounds. It seems that reformers leveraged the popular outrage at 
the greed of venal public officials and unscrupulous private interests to mobilize support for a 
broader reform agenda. Rather than soft-peddling or obscuring their anticorruption message, these 
reformers leaned into it—and were generally quite successful. 
 
Taken as a whole, then, the U.S. historical experience seems most consistent with the conventional 
view that the recipe for fighting systemic corruption includes both aggressive “direct” efforts to de-
tect and punish individual corrupt actors, and significant “indirect” structural reforms that mitigate 
the incentives and opportunities for engaging in corruption. Our brief survey suggests that U.S. ex-
perience is inconsistent with the idea that a government can tame systemic corruption through a 
sufficiently aggressive crackdown, but the U.S. experience also seems inconsistent with the idea that 
enforcing anticorruption laws and rules against individual wrongdoers is irrelevant or counterpro-
ductive. We stress again that we cannot prove either claim. History only happens once, and we do 
not and cannot know what would have happened if, say, the U.S. in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century had attempted to tackle its systemic corruption problem primarily or exclusively 
with one approach or the other. But our admittedly impressionistic reading of the available evi-
dence suggests that both were important. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the United States had undergone a substantial change in 
both the prevalence of corruption and the means used to target it. That story has been told else-
where, though not entirely comprehensively. The implications of that story for debates about the 
fight against corruption in the modern developing world, however, have not been sufficiently ap-
preciated or discussed. At the very least, the American experience calls into question a number of 
familiar arguments and hypotheses about the best way to tackle this seemingly intractable problem. 
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Moreover, to return to a cautiously optimistic theme we have stressed above, the American experi-
ence over the nineteenth and twentieth century suggests that systemic public corruption is perhaps 
not as intractable as it may seem in the moment. The American story is a testament to the fact that 
change can occur despite entrenched cultural norms and political resistance. It is also a reminder, 
though, that such change plays out over decades or generations, not months or years, and requires 
sustained, determined efforts by both political elites and ordinary citizens. 
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